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INTRODUCTION: DESIGN-BASED LIABILT IN AMERICAN PRODUCTS
LIABumrY LAW
Myths die hard. Many believers cling to them long after they
have been discredited. Three decades after the onset of the American
products liability revolution, a widely shared belief persists that the
general standard for defective product design is unsettled.' Although
1 See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALT Restate-
mentPrjec 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 646-650, 654, 685-86 (1995) (noting the unsettled nature
of products liability law); Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1407,
1408-09 (1994) (arguing that different jurisdictions employ varying standards in defective
product design cases); Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1665-66,
1677-82 (1995) (book review) (noting a "lack of uniformity" in the area of products liabil-
ity). From the early days of products liability to the present, courts have said that the
definition of design defect is elusive and difficult to discern. See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago
Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1329 (Conn. 1997) ("[C]ourts have sharply disagreed
over the appropriate definition of defectiveness in design cases."); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co.,
365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984) ("[Q]uestions related to 'design defects' and the deter-
mination of when a product is defective, because of the nature of its design, appear to be
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thousands upon thousands of design defect decisions have been re-
ported, reflecting generally consistent patterns of outcomes, the myth
continues. This Article demonstrates that, contrary to this mistaken
perception, a pragmatic and theoretically sound standard for defec-
tive design can be articulated and, in fact, the overwhelming majority
of American courts have adopted such a standard. Not surprisingly, a
powerful combination of social norms and inexorable logic both sup-
port and demand acceptance of this standard as the governing rule.
It is time for the myth to give way to reality. Consensus has been
achieved.
At the outset, this Article rejects two extreme positions that ques-
tion the need to develop a general standard for defective design. The
first position argues for some form of enterprise liability without re-
quiring plaintiffs to establish a design defect.2 The second position
questions the institutional capability of courts to review design deci-
sions and, in the absence of direct governmental regulation, defers
responsibility for design choices exclusively to the market.3 Given that
these views have no support in the case law, nothing is served by tilting
at windmills.4 Liability for harm caused by defective design is alive
and well. Defining its proper contours is the order of the day.
One should begin by placing liability for defective design in its
proper context. By now, everyone accepts the tripartite division of
product defects: manufacturing defects, warning defects, and design
defects.5 The law regarding manufacturing defects is both well settled
and easily applied.6 And while application of the failure-to-warn doc-
the most agitated and controversial issues before the courts in the field of products liabil-
ity."); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Or. 1974) ("[C] ourts continue
to flounder while attempting to determine how one decides whether a product is 'in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.'").
2 See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, ImplementingEnterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and
Twerski 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1157, 1160-66 (1992) (arguing that enterprise liability is superior
to a negligence regime);Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance External-
ity: An Economic Justkflcation for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 168-73 (1990)
(discussing justifications for enterprise liability).
3 SeeJames A. Henderson,Jr.,Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 passim (1973).
4 The authors are unaware of any case law adopting enterprise liability. In addition,
the courts have considered and rejected Professor Henderson's thesis that design safety
review is beyond the institutional capability of courts. See, e.g., Owens v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372, 377-78 (Mich. 1982); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322,
1326 (Or. 1978).
5 See, e.g., Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992); Ulrich v. Kasco
Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d
204, 207 (N.Y. 1983). Several state statutes also differentiate liability standards based on
the type of defect. See, e.g., Mrss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.030 (West 1992).
6 See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987) (noting that a manufacturer is
liable if a claimant proves that the product "deviated from the design specifications, formu-
lae, or performance standards of the manufacturer or from otherwise identical units manu-
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trine can be exceedingly difficult,7 the legal standard is clear.8 In con-
trast to the standards governing manufacturing defects and
inadequate warnings, the standard for establishing defective product
design continues to be the subject of acrimonious and often confused
debate among legal writers,9 leading many observers to the unjustified
conclusion that the proper legal definition of defective design re-
mains elusive. Several factors give credence to the myth. First, section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") got
American courts off on the wrong foot by relying on a single, unified
definition of defectiveness to cover all three forms of product de-
fect.10 It is received wisdom that section 402A imposed a general re-
gime of strict liability." By painting with a broad brush, section 402A
sent courts scrambling to discover how strict liability would apply to
factured to the same manufacturing specifications or formulae"); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) ("[A] defective product is one that differs from the manufac-
turer's intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line.");
Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 200 (Mont. 1986) (noting that a product is
defective if the manufacturer did not construct it correctly and if it does not conform to its
intended design).
7 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 289-311 (1990) (discussing
the "difficult conceptual and doctrinal problems" in applying negligence law to failure to
wam cases); Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approach to Failure-To-Warn Law, 71
N.C. L. REv. 121, 124-27 (1992) (asserting that application of the doctrine has become
problematic); Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1194-98 (1994) (questioning whether giving a warning should suffice
to absolve producers from liability).
8 Liability depends on whether the seller or a predecessor in the distributor chain
failed to provide reasonable instructions or warnings with regard to foreseeable risks. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991) (en banc)
(stating that actual or constructive knowledge of risk is a requisite for failure-to-warn ac-
tion); Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1175 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (same);
Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) (plaintiff "must prove a defendant
knew or should have known of potential risks associated with the use of its product, yet
failed to provide adequate directions or warnings to users").
9 See, e.g., Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to Jury Trial
in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1043,
1087-98 (1994) (arguing that the ALI should modify the Restatement so that proof of an
alternative design is a factor but not an element of the plaintiffs prima facie case); Theo-
dore S. Jankowski, Focusing on Quality and Risk. The Central Role of Reasonable Alternatives in
EvaluatingDesign and WarningDecisions, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 283, 284-93 (1995) (arguing for
risk-utility analysis in design defect cases); Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Hee4 61 TENN. L. REV.
1265 (1994) (arguing that the Restatements negligence approach to design defects consti-
tutes a "major mistake"). For a more balanced view, employing the metaphor of mythol-
ogy, see David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth,
1996 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 743.
10 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SEC-
oND)] provided for liability against one who sold a product "in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer." It made no distinction, either in the black
letter or comments, among the various kinds of defects.
11 See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1158-60 (Cal. 1972) (en
banc).
870 [Vol. 83:867
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design defects. 12 Second, courts early on intuited that, in some cases,
they could draw an inference of design defect and avoid the need to
articulate or apply a general standard for defectiveness.' 3 Third, both
legal commentators and the practicing bar muddied the waters by
confusing the issue of the standard for design defect with other issues
that have little or nothing directly to do with the standard, such as the
issue of whether the producer should be liable when a design con-
forms with the best technology available at the time of sale.' 4 Finally,
the rhetoric of products liability law is, undeniably, a mess. With a
plethora of available doctrines-e.g., negligence, strict liability, and
express and implied warranties of merchantability-courts have been
at sea trying to determine how the standard for defective design fits
into these doctrinal theories. 15
Although quite real, the rhetorical confusion is largely unneces-
sary. The consensus standard for defective design that American
courts are actually applying is both sound in theory and elegant in
application. But to perceive these truths, it will be necessary to clear
away the rhetorical overgrowth that obscures the underlying reality.
Part I of this Article identifies the relatively easy design cases that do
not require a general standard for defect. Part II develops concep-
tually and normatively the proper general standard for design defect
for classic design cases that do not fall within the easy-case rubric.
Part I puts the normatively derived standard to the test by asking
empirically whether the reported cases support the theory. In doing
so, Part Ill identifies those ancillary issues, both real and rhetorical,
that cause confusion in interpreting the case law, which perpetuates
12 See, e.g., Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 377-78 (Mo.
1986) (en banc); i& at 389 (Blackmar, J., concurring); id. at 393 (Weliver, J., dissenting);
Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 62-63 (N.M. 1995); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach.
Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Or. 1974); Vincer v. Esther Williams Al-Aluminum Swimming
Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 797-99 (Wis. 1975).
13 See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 959 (Md. 1976) (holding
that the catastrophic failure of a product in normal use does not require risk-utility balanc-
ing to determine defect); Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 271 N.W.2d 777, 783 (Mich.
1978) (holding that plaintiff need not identify whether the failure of a ball joint was due to
a manufacturing defect, design defect, or improper material if an inference can be made
that some defect attributable to the manufacturer caused the accident).
14 See, e.g., Johnson v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. 1980); Phillips, supra note 9,
at 1271; John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New
Cloth"for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. Ruv. 493 (1996) (confusing the requirement of reasonable alternative
design and the issue of whether a seller should be charged with knowledge of risk at time
of trial).
15 See, e.g., Tipton v. Michelin Tire Co., 101 F.3d 1145, 1149-50 (6th Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing how design defect cases fit into the theories of strict liability and negligence);
Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 533 P.2d 717, 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (same); Has-
son v. Ford Motor Co., 564 P.2d 857, 871-72 (Cal. 1977) (en banc) (same); Greiten v.
LaDow, 235 N.W.2d 677, 681-82 (Wis. 1975) (same).
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the myth of indeterminacy. With the overgrowth removed, Part III
demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of courts have consist-
ently applied a common-sense test for design defect, forcing the con-
clusion that consensus has been achieved. Part IV examines the new
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)") and
demonstrates that it supports the conclusions reached in this Article.
It should surprise no one that the recently approved Restatement
(Third) adopts the consensus definition of defective design derived
herein from both common-sense norms and reported case law.16 As
Reporters for the American Law Institute ("ALI") in that project, the
authors were charged with overseeing the tasks of determining what
the law is and what it should be. Fortunately, as those involved in the
ALI project came to realize, the two tasks merged into one. Why that
is so-indeed, why it must be so-is the story this Article will now
endeavor to tell.
I
DEMONSTRABLY DEFEcrivE DESIGNS: WHY APPLICATION OF A
GENERAL STANDARD Is SOMETIMES NOT NECESSARY
Before considering what a general definition of defective design
might look like, it will be useful to identify those cases in which prod-
uct designs are demonstrably defective and thus application of a gen-
eral design standard is not necessary. Subsequent discussions will
examine American case law to determine which general standard
courts have adopted for application in classic, mainstream design
cases. It will be useful in those latter contexts to be able to identify
decisions in which, because the products do not conform to specific
safety standards, the nature of the general design standard is not at
issue. Specific design standards may emanate from the producer and
thus may be characterized as "internal;" or they may emanate from
outside sources and thus may be characterized as "external." In either
event, when a specific standard is available and is recognized as appli-
cable, the court may deem a design that fails to conform to that stan-
dard defective without undertaking the more difficult task of applying
a general definition of defect. These design cases are relatively easy to
decide because, given that the normative standards are relatively spe-
cific and the relevant facts are typically undisputed, the conclusion of
defectiveness has a compelling, "per se" quality about it. In contrast,
determining defectiveness under a general design standard requires a
16 The ALI approved the Proposed Final Draft of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LiABiLriY (Apr. 1, 1997) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] at its Annual Meet-
ing on May 20, 1997. The Reporters supported several clarifying amendments that were
submitted to the membership, and several amendments that were offered from the floor
were adopted. The final draft of the Restatement (Third) will incorporate these changes.
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more nuanced analysis that is typically more difficult for courts to
perform.
Internal design standards may be explicit or implicit. Explicit in-
ternal standards arise when the producer affirms or promises that the
design contains certain safety features or will perform certain func-
tions safely. If the design fails to conform to such an explicit affirma-
tion or promise and the failure causes harm, the producer will be
subject to liability based on the doctrinal rules governing express war-
ranty17 and misrepresentation, 18 whether or not the design is defec-
tive under the generally applicable test for defectiveness. Thus, if the
producer of an automobile affirms or promises that the automobile
will float safely in water and it fails to do so, thereby harming its occu-
pants, the producer will be subject to liability19 even if, under the gen-
eral standard, automobiles are not defectively designed merely
because they do not float. 20
Implicit internal safety standards are also straightforward.
Whatever greater levels of safety may be required under the general
design standard, at the very least a producer will be held responsible
when its design does not safely perform the functions for which it is
presumably intended.2 ' Observe that this modest assertion refers only
to the producer's presumed intentions regarding what functions, at a
minimum, the design should be able to perform safely. It makes no
reference to foreseeable-but-unintended functions for which users
might nevertheless reasonably have a right to expect the design to
perform safely. Reasonable foreseeability is an important considera-
tion in applying the general standard of defectiveness when more spe-
cific design standards are not available.2 2 But reliance on reasonable
foreseeability destroys the specificity necessary to make the designs in
these cases demonstrably defective. Limiting the implicit affirmations
of design safety to the narrower set of functions that a reasonable per-
son would assume the producer intended supplies the specificity nec-
essary to render these designs demonstrably defective. Indeed, when
17 See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1995).
18 See RESrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, § 402B.
19 See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 1932) (holding a car
manufacturer liable for injuries that a shattered windshield caused when manufacturer
had represented that the windshield was nonshatterable).
20 See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) ("We do
agree that ... an automobile manufacturer is under no duty to design [a] vehicle... that
floats on water. .. ").
21 See, e.g., Sanders v. Quikstak, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[A] jury
may infer that an accident occurred because of a defect when the plaintiff has proven that
the product did not perform as intended and has excluded all causes of the accident not
attributable to the defendant.").
22 See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 355 (Md. 1985) ("We
conclude, as have most courts which have considered the issue, that 'reasonable foresee-
ability' is the appropriate test [for defective design.]").
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a relatively new product fails to perform even the basic function that
the producer must have intended it to perform, one's first reaction is
to assume that a manufacturing defect must have caused the product
to malfunction. 23
Thus, a producer that sells a new automobile with the manifest
(although implicit) intention that it provide safe and effective trans-
portation under normal conditions is liable to those harmed when the
automobile fails dangerously to perform that basic function. For ex-
ample, if a fire spontaneously starts under the dash of the automobile
while it is being driven in a normal, obviously intended manner, then
the case for liability is straightforward-a self-defeating malfunction of
this most basic sort demands that the courts hold the producer re-
sponsible for the resulting harm. In effect, the malfunction of the
product "speaks for itself' on the issue of defectiveness in a manner
quite similar to the operation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
within the common law of negligence. 24 In those instances in which
such a malfunction occurs as a result of the product design, the court
should not have to undertake the difficult task of applying a general
standard to conclude that the design is defective. Indeed, the plaintiff
is not required to prove what sort of defect-manufacturing defect or
design defect-caused the malfunction; in either event the manufac-
turer is subject to liability.25
In contrast, if any circumstance surrounding an accident extends
beyond the narrowly defined performance functions that the pro-
ducer manifestly (although implicitly) intends, the court may not
draw an inference of defect from the mere fact of the accident. In-
stead, the court must apply the general defectiveness standard to de-
termine the producer's responsibility for design-related injury. For
example, if a driver operated an automobile in such a manner as to
collide violently with another automobile, resulting in harm to the
occupants, the measure of defectiveness described in this discussion
of implicit internal standards would not be applicable because the
producer presumably does not intend violent collisions. To be sure,
23 See Henderson, supra note 3, at 1548-49 (explaining how manufacturing defects are
functionally similar to defective designs that cause product malfunctions).
24 See Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209 (7th Cir. 1994).
The doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] is not strictly applicable to a products
liability case because... the defendant... has parted with possession and
control of the harmful object before the accident occurs. But the doctrine
merely instantiates the broader principle, which is as applicable to a prod-
ucts case as to any other tort case, that an accident can itself be evidence of
liability.
Id. at 211 (citation omitted).
25 See, e.g., Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Flanery, 612 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ark. 1981) ("[P]roof
of the specific defect is not required when common experience tells us that the accident
would not have occurred in the absence of a defect.").
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collisions are reasonably foreseeable, and the general design standard
may support a conclusion of defectiveness based on the design's inad-
equate crashworthiness.2 6 However, the automobile's defectiveness
would not be demonstrable in the sense being developed here. Anal-
ogously to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under the common law of
negligence, an inference of defect is supported only when the very
nature of the accident supports the conclusion that the product failed
to function as the producer itself must have intended it to function.27
When harm to occupants results from an automobile's violent colli-
sion with another vehicle, a more nuanced analysis under the general
standard for determining design defectiveness is necessary.
The analysis thus far has considered instances in which specific
design standards emanate internally from the producer itself. It re-
mains to consider instances in which specific design standards ema-
nate externally, from sources other than the producer. Once again,
these specific standards may be explicit or implicit. Explicit external
safety standards are contained in specific safety statutes and regula-
tions to which designs must conform. When a court determines that a
design fails to conform to such an external standard and that the fail-
ure has caused harm, defectiveness is demonstrable, and a court may
subject the producer to liability without determining whether the de-
sign would be considered defective under the general definition of
defective design.28 Industry safety standards, when explicit and spe-
cific, also provide a basis for subjecting producers to liability for harm
caused by designs that fail to conform to such external standards.
Although formally promulgated industry design standards lack the
force of law for regulatory purposes, courts resolving tort claims tend
to treat violations of such specific industry standards in much the
same way as they treat violations of governmental standards. Perhaps
because consumers generally rely on producers to conform-at a min-
imum-to recognized industry safety standards, nonconformance
with such standards tends to be conclusive on the issue of defective
design. 29 Implicit external design standards take the form of industry
26 See, e.g., Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 782 (W. Va. 1991)
(reviewing the doctrine of crashworthiness in the United States).
27 Conversely, the design's conformance to implicit standards based on manifestly in-
tended functions does not provide a ceiling on the producer's responsibility. The leading
authority for this assertion is Larsen v. General Motors, Inc., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968),
which holds that even when the defect in design did not cause the initial accident, the
manufacturer has a duty "to use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of a prod-
uct to minimize injuries." Id. at 504.
28 See, e.g., Wells v. City of Vancouver, 467 P.2d 292, 295 (Wash. 1970) ("The scope of
the duty imposed by statutory rule is a matter of law.").
29 See generally MARsHALL S. SHApo, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LLABrrv 11.02[8] [a] (2d
ed. 1990) (explaining why courts are likely to grant evidentiary weight to industry
standards).
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custom. The universal rule is that nonconformance with informal in-
dustry standards may provide significant support for a conclusion of
defectiveness, 0 but that conformance to customary design standards,
while always admissible, is never controlling.31
As subsequent discussions make clear, recognizing these special
instances when designs are demonstrably defective is important when
measuring support in the case law for a particular definition of the
general design standard. For example, even courts that reject con-
sumer expectations and adopt a risk-utility test as the general standard
for defective design may refer to designs that unexpectedly malfunc-
tion as designs that disappoint consumer expectations. 32 Failure to
understand that instances of self-defeating design malfunction are
special cases that do not involve application of the general design
standard may lead to the mistaken conclusion that such ajurisdiction
embraces a general "consumer expectations" definition of design de-
fect, when quite the opposite is true.33
II
DEVELOPING A GENERAL DEFEcTvENEss STANDARD FOR
CLAssIc DESIGN CASES
A. The Nature of Classic Design Cases
The preceding Part defines demonstrably defective designs as
those that fail to comply with specific safety standards and thus may be
found to be defective without the necessity of applying a general de-
fectiveness standard. Determining that a product design fails to meet
a specific standard presents relatively few conceptual problems. In
most cases, a design either conforms to a specific safety standard or it
does not; and if it does not conform, it is demonstrably defective. Pri-
mary issues of fact may be disputed, but nuanced value judgments are
not necessary. This Part examines those classic design cases in which
either no specific safety standards apply or the designs comply with
applicable standards, but the plaintiffs nevertheless plausibly claim
that the designs are unacceptably dangerous, and therefore, legally
30 See, e.g., Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing sum-
mary judgment against plaintiff and noting that plaintiff proved that many firms in defen-
dant's industry produced safer designs).
31 The T. j. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), is the leading authority concern-
ing conformity to custom in an industry.
32 See, e.g., Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
("[E]vidence of the nature of an accident itself may, under certain circumstances, give rise
to a reasonable inference that the product was defective because the circumstances of the
product's failure may be such as to frustrate the ordinary consumer's expectations of its
continued performance.").
33 See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997)
(finding support for a consumer expectations standard in prior decisions involving prod-
uct malfunctions); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing Potter).
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defective. To respond adequately to such a claim, the court must ap-
ply a general normative standard that determines at what point
designed-in danger becomes unacceptable and the design, for that
reason, is defective.
A concrete example will be useful. Consider an automobile trav-
eling ten miles per hour whose axle is inadvertently designed so that it
breaks upon hitting a two-inch depression in the street and causes the
driver to lose control and suffer serious injuries. On those facts, the
driver's claim of defective design would be demonstrably defective as
earlier defined. No court would refuse to allow the jury to infer a
design defect based on the failure of the automobile to meet its mani-
festly intended function. 34 However, as both the speed of the car and
the depth of the depression increase, cases involving axle failure lose
their res ipsa-like quality. Thus, at a combination of thirty miles per
hour and an eight-inch pot hole the court should not allow the jury to
draw an inference of defect from the circumstance of axle failure.
This is what is referred to here as a "classic" case. To find a defect on
these facts, the court will require the jury to apply some sort of gen-
eral normative standard regarding how much axle strength automo-
bile designs should require. 35
B. Distinguishing Between Fairness-Based and Efficiency-Based
Design Standards
The normative foundations of tort may be separated into two ba-
sicjustifications for civil liability. From one perspective, liability is sup-
ported on noninstrumental, fairness grounds. 36 On that view, the
imposition of tort liability achieves corrective justice between the par-
ties. From the other perspective, liability is supported on instrumen-
tal, efficiency grounds.37 On that view, liability deters wastefully
dangerous activity, thereby helping to achieve economic efficiency. In
recent years, legal scholars have paid much attention to the differ-
34 The seminal decision is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J.
1960) in which the court permitted an inference of defect when the steering failed in a
new automobile being driven normally. Id. at 98.
35 See, e.g., Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) ("[A] com-
plex product ... may often cause injury in a way that does not engage its ordinary consum-
ers' reasonable minimum assumptions about safe performance .... [A] product is still
defective if its design embodies 'excessive preventable danger'.... But this determination
involves technical issues of feasibility, cost, practicality, risk, and benefit. .. ").
36 See, e.g., Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's Neigh-
bors, 77 IOwA L. REv. 403 (1992) (discussing various forms of corrective justice and how
they provide a justification for tort law); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537, 537-56 (1972) (describing a widely held view of tort liability,
the "paradigm of reciprocity," and how it is grounded in terms of fairness).
37 See, e.g., PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G. Owen ed., 1995);
RicHARD A. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIS OF LAW 206-11 (4th ed. 1992) (analyzing the justi-
fication for damages in intentional tort cases using an efficiency paradigm).
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ences between these perspectives and the analytical problems that
each presents. 38 Rather than attempting to solve these problems
here, this Part identifies the most commonly advanced standards for
defective design associated with each perspective, leaving to later dis-
cussions the task of choosing between them.
The noninstrumental legal standard for design defects that schol-
ars most often propose to achieve corrective justice between parties is
reasonable consumer expectations.3 9 Judged by this standard, a de-
sign is defective if it is dangerous to an extent that disappoints reason-
able expectations regarding safe use and consumption. As an
independent standard for deciding classic design cases, the reason-
able consumer expectations model rests on the premise that when a
purchaser has paid value for a product, he and others have a right to
expect that it will not cause harm unfairly.40 Quite clearly, application
of this standard relies heavily on intuition. However, its proponents
have confidence that, especially with the American civil jury system,
triers of fact will reach appropriate outcomes.41
The instrumental standard for design defects that scholars most
commonly advance is reasonable design safety based on risk-utility
analysis. Proponents believe that imposition of this standard deters
the distribution of wastefully dangerous products, thereby helping to
achieve optimal levels of design safety. In this regard, the risk-utility
analysis employed in determining defective design is quite close to, if
not identical with, the risk-utility analysis employed in determining
negligence at common law.42 Compared with the consumer expecta-
tions standard, the reasonableness standard based on risk-utility analy-
sis relies less on intuition and more on a balancing of articulated
considerations regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of
the product as designed and as it alternatively could have been
38 See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
CorrectiveJustic, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1801, 1802-11 (1997) (documenting the differences be-
tween the corrective and deterrence schools of thought); Matthew S. O'Connell, Note,
Correcting CorrectiveJustice: Unscrambling the Mixed Conception of Tort Law, 85 GEo. LJ. 1717,
1717-33 (1997) (discussing two competing theories of corrective justice).
39 The seminal work on the consumer expectations standard is Marshall S. Shapo, A
Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product
Disappointmen 60 VA. L. Ray. 1109 (1974).
40 See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Lia-
bility, 69 CAL. L. REv. 919, 935-36 (1981) (discussing fairness towards a consumer's reason-
able expectations as a traditional justification for strict products liability).
41 See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 810-11 (Or. 1967) (O'Connell,J.,
dissenting) (arguing that ajury is well-equipped to decide whether a product performed as
a reasonable person would expect).
42 See, e.g., Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 600 (1997) ("[Tlhis suit is based on negligence rather than on strict
products liability. But there is little or no practical difference in a case of defective design
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designed. The reasonableness standard based on risk-utility analysis
considers factors such as the likely effects of the alternative design on
product longevity, maintenance, repair, aesthetics, and the benefits in
the form of reduced accident costs to be derived from adoption of the
safer alternative.43
C. Why Disappointment of Consumer Expectations Is an
Inappropriate Standard for Defectiveness in Classic
Design Cases
Proponents of the consumer expectations standard rely on sec-
tion 402A, comment i, of the Restatement (Second) which states that for
a product to be unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of the
black letter law, it "must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its char-
acteristics." 44 Notwithstanding its superficial appeal, any argument
that the ALI ever intended the consumer expectations test to consti-
tute an independent, governing standard for design defect liability
under section 402A is sheer folly. Dean Prosser, the Reporter respon-
sible for drafting section 402A, writing some seven years after its pro-
mulgation, made it clear that the standard for both design and failure-
to-warn defects sounds in classic negligence. 45 Other scholars have
further demonstrated that the ALI simply never contemplated, in the
early 1960s, that some form of true strict liability should govern classic
design cases. 46 Indeed, the text of comment i renders such an inter-
43 Cf. Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305 (Cal. 1994) (reviewing past
products liability cases which pointed out that ajury will often have to weigh factors bear-
ing on the "feasibility, practicality, risk, and benefit" of safer alternatives).
44 RE TATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 10, § 402A cmt. i.
45 In his treatise, The Law of Torts, Dean Prosser states:
There are ... two particular areas in which the liability of the manufac-
turer, even though it may occasionally be called strict, appears to rest pri-
marily upon a departure from proper standards of care, so that the tort is
essentially a matter of negligence.
One of these involves the design of the product, which includes plan,
structure, choice of materials, and specifications. There is no doubt
whatever that the manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care to
design a product that is reasonably safe for its intended use, and for other
uses which are foreseeably probable. The question turns on what is reason-
able care and what is reasonable safety....
The second area in which negligence appears to predominate is that of
warning of the dangers involved in use of the product, and, where called
for, directions for its use. There is no dispute that the seller is under a duty
to give adequate warning of unreasonable dangers involved in the use of
which he knows, or should know.
WiLLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 644-47 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
46 See, e.g., George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDozo L.
REv. 2301 passim (1989).
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pretation doubtful.47 The simple truth is that liability for defective
design was in its nascent stages in the early 1960s and section 402A did
not address it meaningfully, if at all.
On any view, consumer expectations as a standard separate from
risk-utility fails on normative grounds. Even if one assumes that fair-
ness-based, noninstrumental values underlie tort, consumer expecta-
tions provide an incoherent basis upon which to measure producer
responsibility. In many instances, avoiding one type of design-related
risk by incorporating one safety feature can be accomplished only by
increasing the probability of encountering another risk of equal or
even greater magnitude. 48 Persons injured by either risk will contend
that their expectations were disappointed; and in each separate con-
text, the consumer expectations test provides no means of evaluating
one set of expectations against the other. Are both seemingly contra-
dictory claims to be countenanced?49 Moreover, what standard
should govern when consumer expectations are below those that rea-
sonable design technology can deliver? If the risks of a design are
patently obvious, consumers may have no basis for expecting greater
safety even though they might reasonably desire it. Should the open
and obvious nature of a design feature bar liability even if it would
have been feasible and reasonable to eliminate the risk of injury?50
One might insist that certain sets of consumer expectations are unrea-
sonable. However, what independent standard would courts apply to
determine that these expectations are unreasonable? If the answer to
47 Comment i, in describing the concept of unreasonable danger, provides:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good
whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey,
containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of
smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana
may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably danger-
ous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arter-
ies and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous
fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 10, § 402A cmt. i. These examples hardly support the
use of a consumer expectations test in a classic design case.
48 See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[W]hile the
jury found Chrysler liable for not producing a rigid enough vehicular frame, a factfinder in
another case might well hold the manufacturer liable for producing a frame that is too
rigid.").
49 Clearly this possibility disturbed the Dawson court. Id. ("[Wle affirm the judgment
[for plaintiff] ... with uneasiness regarding the consequences of our decision .... ").
Dawson involved a risk-utility standard; the problem would be compounded under a con-
sumer expectations standard.
50 Cf infra Part IIIA.5 (discussing the "patent danger rule" and concluding that this
outmoded and discredited rule should not bar defendant's liability).
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these difficulties is to conclude that reasonable consumers have a
right to expect reasonably efficient levels of design safety, then the
analysis has come full circle to the risk-utility standard from which the
consumer expectations test sought to escape. What is the standard for
reasonably safe design other than a risk-utility standard?51
At an even more fundamental level, it is incoherent to utilize the
expectations of the ordinary consumer as the barometer for a nonin-
strumental, fairness-based standard of liability. As with all attempts to
articulate fairness norms as standards for judging the appropriateness
of various forms of behavior, the central problem is trying to eliminate
individual preferences in order to achieve objectivity. Here, as else-
where, the attempt encounters substantial difficulties. 52 Indeed, reli-
ance on expectations is especially vexatious in this regard. The
concept of consumer expectations carries with it inescapable psycho-
logical connotations that frustrate attempts to objectify the appropri-
ate standard. Is the ordinary consumer to be characterized as risk-
averse or risk-preferring? Is the ordinary consumer willing to sacrifice
aesthetics, economy, or ease of repair for greater safety? It is unrealis-
tic to believe that one can surgically separate ordinary consumer ex-
pectations from the value preferences of flesh-and-blood human
beings.53 Risk-utility analysis confronts this same problem of objecti-
51 See, e.g., Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 600 (1997) ("[Risk-utility and consumer expectations come] to the same
thing; the consumer expects the products he buys not to be defectively designed.").
52 The American philosopherJohn Rawls attempts to achieve objectivity in A Theory of
Justice by invoking a bargaining model in which rational actors, having been placed hypo-
thetically in what he refers to as "the original position," are posited to work their way, via
consensual exchange, to a solution that organizes society in ajust manner. JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OFJUSTICE 118-92 (1971). For the model to have any persuasive claim based on
reason, Rawls must impose knowledge conditions, captured by the phrase "the veil of igno-
rance," that eliminate sources of destructive self interest. Id. at 136-42. In a powerful cri-
tique of Rawls's theory, Robert Wolff argues that the model is inherently unworkable.
ROBERT PAUL WOuFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLs (1977). Wolff concludes:
At the heart of the theory in A Theory of Justice lies a formal model of a
bargaining game. The power of the theory consists in the creativity and
imagination of that device, by means of which Rawls hoped to bypass the
sterile dispute between intuitionism and utilitarianism. Speaking narrowly,
from within the framework of Rawls's own mode of analysis, the maneuver
will not work because the model must either impute too much particularity
to the players, in order to enable them to bargain to a determinate and
predictable outcome or else so totally strip them of their individuating
characteristics that no determinate bargaining game can be defined.
Id. at 209-10.
53 Robert Wolff notes:
[I]f there are serious methodological or epistemological grounds for sup-
posing that human beings could not have the sorts of general knowledge
Rawls attributes to the parties in the original position, without their also
having to be aware of the sorts of particular facts about themselves that are
cloaked by the veil of ignorance-if, in short, the particular combination of
knowledge and ignorance required by Rawls's construction is in principle
impossible-then the entire theory will be called into question. I do not
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fying the normative standard.5 4 However, compared with the con-
sumer expectations standard, risk-utility analysis more successfully
addresses this problem.
These conceptual problems are compounded by the unique diffi-
culties that one encounters in formulating a standard for defective
design that is manageable in court. To the extent to which a fairness-
based consumer expectations standard relies on intuition in attempt-
ing to respond to classic design cases not involving product malfunc-
tion, it is so vague as to be lawless. 55 As one leading authority has
observed:
The meaning is ambiguous and the [consumer expectations] test is
very difficult [to apply] to discrete problems.... The test can be
utilized to explain most any result that a court or jury chooses to
reach. The application of such a vague concept in many situations
does not provide much guidance .... 56
D. Why a Risk-Utility Standard Requiring Proof of a Reasonable
Alternative Design Is the Only Sensible Standard for
Determining Defectiveness in Classic Design Cases
Given the problems described in the preceding section, some
form of risk-utility standard must win by default unless it, too, suc-
cumbs to the same difficulties as the consumer expectations standard.
A fair assessment in this regard is that, while some of the problems
described above undoubtedly confront risk-utility, the risk-utility stan-
dard solves them much more readily than a standard based on con-
sumer expectations. Risk-utility analysis deals more comfortably with
the necessity of making cross-personal comparisons regarding con-
sumer preferences. The operative perspective in risk-utility analysis is
the objective one of achieving reasonable design safety from an over-
all, societal standpoint,57 not the more subjective perspective of per-
for a moment suppose that I can prove so strong a claim (though Rawls has
said nothing at all to prove its contrary), but I do think there are powerful
reasons for at least doubting the cognitive possibility of the original posi-
tion as Rawls has characterized it.
WoLF, supra note 52, at 122.
54 See infra note 57 and accompanying text. Robert P. Wolff, whose critique of Rawls's
philosophy is quoted earlier, see supra notes 52-53, observes: "[One of the] most obvious
weaknesses of utilitarianism [is] its inability to explain how rationally self-interested plea-
sure-maximizers are to be led to substitute the general happiness for their own as the
object of their actions." WOLFF, supra note 52, at 11.
55 For a discussion of why vague standards should be lawless, see Henderson, supra
note 3, at 1534-42 (noting that courts are not well-equipped to adjudicate disputes which
do not pose manageable, principled questions).
56 W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 699
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).
57 For a discussion of the "overall benefits to society" approach in microeconomics,
see POSNER, supra note 37, at 12-16 (referring to the basis of the approach as "the Kaldor-
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sonal (albeit somehow collective), psychological expectations.58 Risk-
utility analysis also better identifies the factual data relevant in reach-
ing decisions on product defectiveness. The social costs considered in
risk-utility balancing are the costs of adopting better, safer technology,
including both capital and operating costs.5 9 The relevant benefits
are reductions in accident costs achieved by reducing both the likeli-
hood and the severity of product-related accidents. 6° Moreover, while
not perfect, a risk-utility standard for defective design renders deci-
sions in classic design cases more manageable in court. Unlike the
consumer expectations test that is almost wholly based on intuition
and thus not subject to judicial limitation, the risk-utility test is rela-
tively focused. The question in risk-utility balancing is whether the
risk that culminated in plaintiffs harm was reasonably preventable.
Technological data and expert opinion inform the court as to the
practical limitations on product design and provide boundaries for
the discussion of the defect. 61
Assuming that the normative case has been made in favor of a
risk-utility standard for defective design, a further question remains to
be answered: What kind of risk-utility standard? Two possibilities pres-
ent themselves: first, a standard that determines design defectiveness
by asking whether a reasonable person would have distributed the
product that harmed the plaintiff, designed in the same way as the
defendant's product; and second, a standard that asks only whether a
reasonable person would have designed the defendant's product
more safely so as to reduce or prevent the plaintiffs harm. The first,
broader variation on risk-utility supports finding the defendant's
product design defective if a reasonable person would not have sold
the product at all, even if a safer alternative design was not available.
Hicks concept"). See also David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test forDesign Defectiveness: "Micro-
Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1661, 1692-98 (1997) (arguing that the "risk-
utility" test should be renamed the "cost-benefit" test).
58 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
59 Learned Hand's classic formulation of the risk-utility approach is set forth in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). For an explanation
of Hand's formulation, see Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32
(1972) ("[The burden of taking precautions includes] the cost of installing safety equip-
ment or otherwise making the activity safer, or the benefit forgone by curtailing or elimi-
nating the activity.").
60 See Posner, supra note 59, at 32 ("Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident
if it occurs by the probability of occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to be
anticipated from incurring the costs necessary to prevent the accident.").
61 When parties fail to provide technical support for assertions regarding the feasibil-
ity of safer designs, courts refuse to allow triers of fact to speculate intuitionally. See, e.g.,
Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 520 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit proposed expert's
testimony when "the expert's bald statement that a safety.., device could be implemented
without great cost... was not supported by any data regarding the cost of the materials
necessary to include such a feature").
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The second, narrower variation requires the plaintiff in every classic
design case to establish that a reasonable alternative design was
available.
An example will clarify the difference between these risk-utility
variations. Suppose that a manufacturer distributes a four-feet deep,
above-ground swimming pool with a slippery vinyl liner.62 The plain-
tiff dives into the pool head-first. The plaintiffs hands slide apart on
the vinyl causing her head to hit the bottom, breaking her neck. The
plaintiff claims that: (1) a cost-effective, less slippery liner was available
to the defendant and would have prevented the plaintiff's injuries;
and (2) even if a safer alternative liner was not available, the risks that
above-ground pools present outweigh their social utility and, there-
fore, a reasonable person would not have distributed the pool in the
first place. The broader risk-utility variation described above would
allow both defectiveness arguments in the alternative. The narrower
variation would limit the plaintiff to proving the reasonable availability
of a less-slippery pool liner.
Which of these risk-utility approaches to defective design is pref-
erable? The authors have argued elsewhere that the first variation,
which would allow juries to find the entire category of above-ground
pools defective if the only feasible above-ground pool liners are made
of slippery vinyl, is inappropriate. 63 Several considerations support
this conclusion. The first consideration is institutional. In an earlier
article, the authors explained why the process of adjudication is ill-
suited to determining whether broad categories of products are le-
gally defective:
For the traditional process of adjudication to work rationally
and properly, the parties must use applicable legal doctrine to focus
their claims so that they may insist upon a favorable outcome as a
matter of right. As Professor Fuller explained, some problems are
polycentric in nature. They consist of elements that are connected
to one another as are the strands of a spider's web, so that a deci-
sion with regard to any element affects the decisions with regard to
all the others. Such problems are not suited to judicial resolution
because neither side can move from element to element in an or-
derly sequence.
A certain degree of polycentricity inheres in defective product
design cases generally. Yet courts are able to manage in these tradi-
tional contexts because plaintiffs typically propose alternative de-
signs and ask the judiciary to focus on the relatively small, marginal
62 This hypothetical is based on O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
The hypothetical assumes that the swimming pool was accompanied with adequate warn-
ings that informed the user not to dive into the pool.
63 SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. &Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liabil-
ity Frontier:. The ReJection of Liability Without Defec4 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1297-314 (1991).
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differences between the defendant's design and the proposed alter-
native. With product-category liability, no comparison of marginal
differences is necessary because the plaintiff is arguing that the en-
tire product category, including all possible variations therein,
should be subject to absolute liability. Quite literally, the question
asked in product-category liability cases is: "taking all relevant con-
siderations into account, is the product category in question appro-
priate for use and consumption in society?" Thus, the polycentricity
that inheres in traditional design cases is magnified enormously. 64
One can see that risk-utility-based, product-category liability
claims would be unadjudicable if one considers how the above-ground
swimming pool case would be adjudicated if courts were to recognize
such claims. Would vinyl-lined pools two-feet deep, for which the risks
of people diving head-first are presumably lower, be included? If not,
where would courts draw the boundary regarding above-ground pool
depth? In calculating the aggregate risks such pools present, would
all types of risks-for example, the risks of drowning-be included, or
only the risks that the slipperiness of the vinyl liners pose? On the
benefits side, would all social benefits be included-for example, rec-
reational pleasure? If not, how does one conceptualize the narrower
set of social benefits derived from the slipperiness of the vinyl lining?
If all the social benefits from above-ground pools are to be consid-
ered, how would intangible benefits such as aggregate recreational
pleasure to society at large be quantified?65 Furthermore, placing
aside quantification problems, how could the litigants in individual
tort cases conceivably obtain the nation-wide data necessary for the
court to reach a rationaljudgment?66 Bearing in mind that a finding
on the issue of categorical defectiveness in one case would presumably
not bind the next,6 7 it is foreseeable that opening up the judicial sys-
64 Id at 1305 (footnotes omitted).
65 For a discussion of techniques to measure public benefits in the context of environ-
mental law, see Brian K Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural
Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1029 (1995)
(evaluating the use of the contingent valuation method in quantifying the personal mone-
tary value an individual attributes to an environmental good); David S. Brookshire et al.,
Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of Surey and Hedonic Approaches, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 165
(1982) (examining the willingness of residents to pay for an improvement in air quality).
Benefits must also be measured in connection with marginal risk-utility analysis; but the
valuation problems in connection with marginal analysis would be much less difficult.
Marginal comparisons focus on small differences. Aggregate, categorical comparisons re-
quire much more data and complex assessments of noncommensurates.
66 The dissenting opinion in O'Brien argues persuasively that parties to tort litigation
would not, and could not, obtain the factual data with which to make the necessary evalua-
tions. O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 314 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting).
67 Courts have not applied offensive collateral estoppel in products liability litigation.
See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1982) (revers-
ing district court decision that barred presentation of evidence by defendants where an
"identity of interests" was the only foundation for privity between defendants and parties in
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tern to these types of claims would ask more of courts than they could
deliver.
The other major reason for rejecting the broader version of a
isk-utility standard for defective designs involves the magnitude of
the constraints that category liability would place on consumer choice
in the market. When courts review the reasonableness of product de-
signs marginally, thereby pressuring manufacturers to adopt safer de-
sign alternatives within product categories, they clearly constrain
consumer choice to some extent.68 However, when courts deem en-
tire categories of generically dangerous products defective, thereby
pressuring manufacturers to remove those categories from the mar-
ket, they place constraints of a much greater magnitude on market
choice.69 Thus, it is appropriate for courts to insist, by threat of tort
liability, that safer pool liners be used if they are available and cost-
effective; however, it would be socially detrimental for courts to pres-
sure manufacturers not to sell any variations of above-ground pools
because, on balance, it was judged in tort litigation that such pools
were not "good for society."
Limiting the judicial imposition of design-based liability to those
instances in which the plaintiff can prove that a safer alternative de-
sign could reasonably have been adopted reduces both the "limits-of-
adjudication" and the "undue-market-constraints" problems men-
tioned above. Focusing on relatively small, marginal differences be-
tween the defendant's design and the plaintiff's proposed alternative
renders manageable the risk-utility analysis of whether omission of the
alternative caused the design to be unreasonably dangerous. More-
over, while threatening liability for the omission of reasonable alterna-
tive designs clearly constrains consumer choice in the market, it does
so at an acceptable level. It follows that the only sensible general stan-
dard for determining defectiveness in classic design cases is a risk-util-
ity standard with a requirement that the plaintiff prove the availability
of a reasonable alternative design.
a prior action); Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 987 (Ohio
1983) (holding the reasonableness of design issue not sufficiently "identical" to the prior
case to warrant preclusion).
68 If the plaintiff in the above-ground swimming pool example successfully proved
that a rougher liner were feasible (although more costly) and would reduce injuries, then
manufacturers would probably substitute rougher liners to minimize potential liability. If
such a substitution were made, purchasers of above-ground pools who would never dream
of diving into them headfirst would pay marginally more for rougher liners that were of no
utility to them.
69 If courts effectively removed above-ground pools from the market by imposing cat-
egory-based liability, or caused their costs to consumers to escalate dramatically, the impact
on middle-class Americans would be much greater than in the variation considered above.
See supra note 68.
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One possibility remains to be considered. The preceding discus-
sion of category liability as part of a broader risk-utility standard as-
sumes that the test for categorical defectiveness would support a
finding of defect if the aggregate risks presented by the product-
above-ground pools, for example-exceeded the aggregate benefits to
any extent, however small.70 Now it must be asked whether the "lim-
its-of-adjudication" and "undue-market-constraints" problems de-
scribed above would be reduced to an acceptable level if the
categorical defectiveness concept were limited to instances in which a
product's generic risks were extremely (perhaps egregiously) great
and its social benefits were extremely low (perhaps all but nonexis-
tent).71 Although one is justified in wondering whether such a gratui-
tously dangerous product would ever be marketed, it appears that
such a narrow rule of categorical design liability would be manageable
in court and would not constrain consumer choice in the market. In
a manner similar to other areas of tort, such a risk-utility standard
would employ a quantitative solution to solve potential problems cre-
ated by a lack of a qualitative solution.72 Although the authors are
skeptical that cases that would satisfy such an "egregiously dangerous
design" exception to the requirement of proof of a reasonable alterna-
tive design would ever arise, in theory such an exception would not be
problematic.
III
WHAT COURTS HAvE DoNE IN DECIDING CLASSIC
DESIGN CASES
This Part focuses on the empirical question of what courts, in
fact, have been doing over the past several decades. This Part demon-
strates that the overwhelming majority of American courts have, as
one might have expected based on the preceding normative analysis,
adopted a risk-utility approach in determining design defects. First,
this Part examines the relevant methodology to be used in assessing
the case law. In this regard, it describes the major sources of confu-
sion that might cause the decisions to be erroneously classified. After
identifying potential sources of errors in classification, it examines
70 This assumption is imbedded in Hand's treatment of the risk-utility calculus in the
Carroll Towing decision: "[]f the probability [of an accidental injury] be called P; the in-
jury, L; and the burden [of precaution], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P...." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(emphasis added).
71 That is, instances in which the B is very low and the PL is very high. See id.
72 A good example of this type of quantitative adjustment of liability rules to solve
manageability problems is the so-called "intentional infliction of emotional distress" tort,
in which the requirements that the defendant's conduct be "outrageous" (rather than sim-
ply intentional) and the upset be "severe" (rather than merely harmful) render the emo-
tional distress tort manageable. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 10, § 46.
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what the courts have done. With this accomplished, it draws conclu-
sions regarding what American courts have actually done by way of
defining defective design. Lastly, this Part looks at what respected
legal scholars have said over the years about the proper test for decid-
ing difficult design cases. The fact that this body of scholarship, ex-
tending over several decades, supports the conclusions that this
Article reaches provides further evidence of the validity of these
conclusions.
A. Identifying Potential Sources of Error in Classifying Published
Decisions
Before considering whether the reported decisions support the
thesis that courts require proof of a reasonable alternative design in
cases in which a general standard for design liability must be applied,
some words of caution are in order. An empirical study of case law in
a field such as products liability is no easy task. Tort cases are particu-
larly fact-sensitive and courts are consequently prone to pepper their
decisions with dicta and footnotes to allow "wiggle room" for cases
that may arise in the future. In contrast to legal treatise writers and
restaters who, in synthesizing the law, tend to speak precisely and cate-
gorically, courts in their published opinions are more likely to be
open-textured and indecisive. In order to improve the validity of the
results of this inquiry into what courts have done, it will be useful to
identify the potential sources of analytical confusion that might cause
design decisions to be misconstrued. Each of the potential sources of
confusion identified in the following subsections takes the form of a
failure to distinguish one type of design case, or issue within a case,
from another, in a manner likely to result in misclassification of the
data.
1. Failure to Distinguish Between Reasonable Alternative Design As
an Expression of the Risk-Utility Standard, Itself, and the
Availability of an Alternative Design As Merely One
Factor to Be Considered in Risk-Utility Balancing
An early, influential writer, John Wade, addressed the defective
design issue in a much-cited article, and advanced seven factors to
weigh in determining the reasonableness of a producer's design
choices. 73 Wade's third factor is "[t]he availability of a substitute
product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe."74
Superficially, this reference to an "available substitute product' might
be taken as equivalent to the risk-utility/reasonable alternative design
73 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-
38 (1973).
74 Id. at 837.
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approach advanced in this analysis. As such, the reasonable alterna-
tive design standard might be viewed as merely one factor among
others for courts to consider.75 However, Wade's reference is not the
logical equivalent of the design standard advanced herein. His refer-
ence to an "available substitute" is to the technological feasibility of an
alternative design: could the producer have adopted a safer design?
The design standard that this Article advances includes, with its re-
quirement that the alternative design be "reasonable," the normative
question of whether the producer should have adopted the alternative
design. 76 Thus, the technical feasibility of Wade's "substitute product"
is properly conceived as an empirical factor for courts to consider in
the normative process of risk-utility balancing.77 In contrast, whether
a reasonable producer would (or would not) have adopted a safer de-
sign is not merely an empirical factor to be considered under risk-
utility balancing. Rather, it constitutes the normative balancing pro-
cess itself.78 It follows that it would be error to rely on judicial refer-
ences to Wade's third factor to support the conclusion that the risk-
utility approach advanced herein is simply one of seven "factors" that
the court will consider.79
2. Failure to Distinguish Between Classic Design Cases and Cases
Involving Demonstrably Defective Designs
Previous sections of this Article distinguish between classic design
cases, in which courts must apply a general standard in order to deter-
mine defectiveness, and cases involving demonstrably defective de-
signs, in which they need not.80 When attempting to determine
empirically whether the general standard courts have adopted consists
of a risk-utility test based on reasonable alternative design or a con-
sumer expectations test, one must be careful to make sure that the
75 See, e.g., Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Colo. 1987) (en banc)
(using the reasonable alternative design standard as merely one factor among a group of
factors to be considered).
76 In addition to the modifier "reasonable," the Restatement (Third) adds the require-
ment that "omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe."
RFsrATEMENT (TruRD), supra note 16, § 2(b).
77 Stated this way, as merely a factor and not as a necessary condition for defective-
ness, Wade implicitly countenances category liability, a position this Article rejects as un-
tenable. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67. That Wade did, in fact, advocate
category liability is clear from his formulation of a general test for product defect: "whether
[the defendant] was then negligent in putting [the product] on the market." Wade, supra
note 73, at 834; cf. supra text accompanying notes 62-67 (discussing category liability).
78 The distinction between the technical feasibility of an alternative design and the
question of whether, on balance, the alternative should have been adopted is developed by
Judge Posner in Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1984) (distinguish-
ing the "feasibility" of a safety feature from the "net advantages" of adopting it).
79 See infra text accompanying notes 219-22.
80 See supra Parts I, II.A.
1998]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
design cases being evaluated are ones in which no "short-cut" in the
form of a specific design standard applies. This is most important
when the specific standard takes the form of the implicitly intended
function of the design. When designs malfunction, violating built-in
standards, courts often explain judgments for plaintiffs in terms of the
designs having "disappointed consumer expectations."8' However,
because such cases do not involve the application of the general de
sign standard, it would constitute error to count such cases as support
for the consumer expectations test as the general standard.
3. Failure to Distinguish Between Design Standards Applicable to
Products Generally and Design Standards Applicable Only to
Unique Subsets of Products
The general standard for design defect that this analysis seeks to
determine is the standard generally applicable to most products. Spe-
cial product categories such as food products,8 2 used products,83 and
prescription drugs8 4 have, with regard to the issue of defective design,
traditionally been treated differently from products generally. Some
of these special design standards rely on disappointment of consumer
expectations as the primary test for defectiveness.8 5 However, because
such standards do not apply to products generally, they do not sup-
port the thesis that the general design standard is based on consumer
expectations. Even jurisdictions that clearly adopt risk-utility as the
general standard may apply a consumer expectations test in cases in-
volving one or more of these special categories.
4. Failure to Distinguish Between Cases Involving Unreasonably
Dangerous Designs and Cases Involving Egregiously
Dangerous Designs
Consistent with an earlier discussion,86 even in risk-utility jurisdic-
tions that require plaintiffs, as a general rule, to prove the availability
of a reasonably safe alternative design, reported decisions refer in dic-
tum to the possibility that some product designs may be so egregiously
dangerous and offer so little social utility that they would be deemed
defective even if no safer alternative design were available. Opinions
81 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Morrison's Cafeteria, Inc. v. Haddox, 431 So. 2d 975 (Ala. 1983) (using a
reasonable expectations test when a boy choked on a fishbone at a restaurant).
83 See, e.g., Turner v. International Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1975) (used truck).
84 See, e.g., West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608 (Ark. 1991) (birth control
medication).
85 See, e.g., Morrison's Cafeteria, 431 So. 2d at 978 (applying a "reasonable expectations"
test).
86 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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of this sort frequently observe that proof of a reasonable alternative
design is, therefore, not necessarily required in every classic design
case.s7 Whether or not the exceptional circumstances of an egre-
giously dangerous design would ever arise, it would constitute error to
classify such a decision as support for the conclusion that, because of
the dictum just described, such a jurisdiction does not adopt reason-
able alternative design as the general standard for design defect.
5. Failure to Distinguish Between What a Plaintiff Must Prove to
Establish Design Defect and What a Defendant May Prove to
Escape Liability
Some jurisdictions that generally apply a risk-utility standard in
determining design defect also recognize what is commonly referred
to as the "patent danger rule."88 This outmoded8 9 and discredited 0
rule holds that even if a court would otherwise deem a design unrea-
sonably dangerous and therefore defective, a defendant is absolved
from liability if the risks the design presents are obvious. The patent
danger rule derives from language in comment i to section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) to the effect that, in order to be defective,
products must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which ordinary
87 See, for example, Wilson v. PiperAircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978) (en banc),
in which the court explained this reasoning.
In this case we focus on the practicability of a safer alternative design and
hold that the evidence was insufficient to permit the trial judge to consider
that factor. Our holding should not be interpreted as a requirement that
this factor must in all cases weigh in plaintiffs favor before the case can be
submitted to the jury. There might be cases in which the jury would be
permitted to hold the defendant liable on account of a dangerous design
feature even though no safer design was feasible (or there was no evidence
of a safer practicable alternative). If, for example, the danger was relatively
severe and the product had only limited utility, the court might properly
conclude that thejury could find that a reasonable manufacturer would not
have introduced such a product into the stream of commerce. We hold
here only that, given the nature of the product and of the defects alleged, it
was improper to submit the issue of a defect in the engine design to the jury
in the absence of appropriate evidence that the safer alternative design was
practicable.
Id. at 1328 n.5.
88 The leading case is Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950), overruled by Micallef
v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
89 The New York Court of Appeals overruled Campo, id., in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348
N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976). A strong majority of American courts rejects the rule. See, e.g.,
Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 235 (Cal. 1970) (noting that "the modern
approach does not preclude liability solely because a danger is obvious").
90 See generally 5 FowLER V. HARPER Er AL., THE LAw OF TORS § 28.5, at 361 n.19 (2d
ed. 1986) (noting that "the 'patent' defect limitation is on the whole rejected in 'strict'
liability cases"); Patricia Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers'
Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 1065, 1067-71 (1973) (arguing that
fairness requires that manufacturers of patently dangerous products be subject to liability
based on risk-utility balancing).
1998]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
consumers would contemplate.9 1 Courts invoking the patent danger
rule sometimes observe that the designs in question meet consumer
expectations because their dangers are obvious.92 However, it would
be error to conclude, based on such a statement involving a limited
application of consumer expectations, that the underlying test for de-
fective design is disappointment of consumer expectations. 93
Although the defendant may employ satisfaction of expectations as a
shield, it does not follow that the plaintiff may employ disappointment
of expectations as a sword independent of a showing of unreasonable
design under a risk-utility standard.
6. Failure to Distinguish Between the Standard Used in Determining
Sufficiency of Plaintiffs Proof and the Standard Used to
Instruct the Jury
The general standard for defective design performs two primary
functions. First, it supplies the substantive measure against which the
judge determines whether the plaintiff has introduced sufficient proof
of design defect to reach the jury. Second, assuming that the plaintiff
has introduced sufficient proof of defect, the standard guides the
court in instructing the jury. The first of these functions is considera-
bly more important than the second. So long as the instructions are
not flatly inconsistent with the recognized legal standard, appellate
courts do (and should) give substantial discretion to trial judges (or
committees on uniform jury instructions) to instruct juries on the is-
sue of defective design as they see fit. For example, even jurisdictions
that require the plaintiff to prove the availability of a reasonable alter-
native design as a prerequisite to reaching the jury often couch their
jury instructions in more general language that includes, and some-
times gives primary emphasis to, other factors such as consumer ex-
pectations. 94 It follows that it would be error, then, to rely on
appellate decisions approving a jury instruction based on consumer
91 See supra note 47.
92 See, e.g., Todd v. Societe BIG, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
when a four-year-old child started a fatal fire with a cigarette lighter, the lighter manufac-
turer was not liable as a matter of law under Illinois law, since "the ordinary consumer
expects that if a lighter's flame is put to some other combustible object, a larger fire
ensues").
93 The federal court that decided Todd clearly recognized that the general standard
for defective design was "rooted" in risk-utility analysis under Illinois law. Id. at 14110.
94 See, e.g., COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3d § 14:19 (approving either a consumer
expectations or risk-utility instruction). The Colorado Supreme Court specifically rejected
the consumer expectations test in Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1245-47
(Colo. 1987) (en banc). See also DisTiucr OF COLUMBIAJURY INSTRUarIONS § 11-11 (defin-
ing unreasonably dangerous as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
templated by the ordinary consumer who purchases the product"). The primary test in the
District of Columbia is risk-utility based. See Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
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expectations to support the conclusion that the jurisdiction necessar-
ily applies a consumer expectations standard in, the more critical con-
text of assessing the sufficiency of the plaintiffs proof of defective
design.
7. Failure to Distinguish Between Substance and Rhetoric
This final source of classification error is possibly the most impor-
tant one of all. Some courts, perhaps committed to the nearly sacro-
sanct rhetoric of comment i to section 402A of the Restatement
(Second),95 insist on describing their general standard for defective de-
sign as if it were based on consumer expectations; but in actuality
these courts apply a risk-utility standard in determining whether the
plaintiff has met the burden of production on the design defect issue.
Some of these courts reveal that their commitment to consumer ex-
pectations is purely rhetorical: consumers have a right to expect rea-
sonable safety in product designs, measured against a substantive
standard of risk-utility and the availability of a reasonable alternative
design.96 Other courts do not explicitly reveal the true substance of
the underlying standard, but perusal of their actual holdings regard-
ing the sufficiency of proof of defective design reveals a pattern that is
consistent only with a substantive standard of risk-utility firmly
anchored in reasonable alternative design.97 It follows that to try to
support the conclusion that consumer expectations is the substantive
design standard merely by quoting out of context the consumer ex-
pectations rhetoric that courts use would be to mischaracterize the
substantive standard that the courts are applying. Quite literally, such
jurisdictions talk one way and act another. The important point is
that here, as elsewhere, actions speak very much louder than words.
B. What the Courts Have Done: Understanding the Decisions
Adopting General Standards for Defective Design
The discussion of reported decisions that follows focuses on the
decisional law in five jurisdictions. The primary goal of this discussion
is not simply to demonstrate that a large number ofjurisdictions agree
with the thesis set forth herein, formidable as the numbers might be.98
Rather, the goal is also to describe the important Ways that various
courts, starting from very different vantage points, have arrived at con-
95 See supra note 47.
96 See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Iowa 1978)
("'The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer'... . Proof of unreasonableness involves a balancing
process. On one side of the scale is the utility of the product and on the other is the risk of
its use.") (quoting REsrATMENT (SEcoND), supra note 10, § 402A cmt. i).
97 See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
98 See cases cited infra notes 99-141.
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clusions that are nearly identical to each other and to those that the
authors suggest. Common-law courts are not totally free to choose the
sequence in which they make their judicial pronouncements. The
facts of the case sub judice exert powerful influences on how decisions
are written. It would have been convenient if courts had first been
faced only with demonstrably defective designs that did not require
the application of a formal standard, and then gradually had been
introduced to the more difficult cases that demanded a rigorous gen-
eral standard. The history of products litigation, of course, was never
so neat. The task of sequencing ideas and making sense out of deci-
sional patterns is largely the task of scholars who can view the pano-
rama and discern the major themes that play out over time and across
jurisdictions. It is in that vein that the theme that "all roads ultimately
lead to reasonable alternative design" is set forth. Different courts
have taken different pathways toward reaching that conclusion. Many
clearly have reached it by now, and others are but a whisker away. It is
time to let the cases tell their own story.
Michigan began its odyssey into design litigation the hard way-
by confronting the necessity for a general standard with which to de-
cide classic design defect cases. In Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,99 the
overhead protective guard of a forklift pinned plaintiff's decedent.100
He had apparently been thrown from the forklift after it struck a con-
crete post.10 1 The plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer of the fork-
lift should have provided some sort of factory-installed driver restraint
system that would have prevented the decedent's ejection.'0 2 Plain-
tiff's expert suggested several such restraint systems.' 03 In upholding
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, the court held that the
plaintiff had failed to produce evidence of the practicality, cost effec-
tiveness, or greater safety of the proffered alternative designs.' 0 4 Two
years later, in Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 105 the Michigan high court un-
dertook a broad review of competing rules to govern design litiga-
tion'06 and cast its lot with the "overwhelming consensus" 10 7 view that
adopts risk-utility balancing. Thus, having intuited the need to estab-
lish a reasonable alternative design in Owen, the Michigan high court
in Prentis firmly rooted such a requirement in risk-utility balancing. In
the ensuing years, both state and federal courts applying Michigan law
99 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982).
100 Id. at 373.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 374.
104 Id. at 378-79.
105 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984).
106 Id. at 180-85.
107 Id. at 183; see also Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 255 (Miss. 1993)
("'Risk utility' has become the trend in most federal and state jurisdictions.").
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have consistently required proof of a reasonable alternative design in
classic design cases.' 08 It should also be noted that Michigan has a
long line of res ipsa-type cases in which demonstrable defectiveness
based on product malfunction has freed the plaintiff from proving
design defect under the general standard.10 9
Maryland first faced the issue of strict products liability in the
context of a res ipsa-like fact pattern. In Phipps v. General Motors
Corp.,110 the plaintiff was injured when the accelerator of his nearly
new Pontiac automobile became stuck without warning, causing the
automobile to accelerate suddenly and leave the road."' In a wide-
ranging discussion, the court noted the view of courts and commenta-
tors that "in a design defect case the standard of defectiveness ...
involving as it does the element of unreasonable danger,... requires
a weighing of the utility of risk inherent in the design against the mag-
nitude of the risk." 1 2 The court went on to say:
However, there are those kinds of conditions which, whether caused
by design or manufacture, can never be said to involve a reasonable
risk. For example, the steering mechanism of a new automobile
should not cause the car to swerve off the road, the drive shaft of a
new automobile should not separate from the vehicle when it is
driven in a normal manner, the brakes of a new automobile should
not suddenly fail, and the accelerator of a new automobile should
not stick without warning, causing the vehicle suddenly to acceler-
ate. Conditions like these, even if resultingfrom the design of the prod-
ucts, are defective and unreasonably dangerous without the necessity of
weighing and balancing the various factors involved.1 13
The pattern of decisions in Maryland is clear and unmistakable. Hav-
ing correctly identified the res ipsa design cases as exceptions to the
general rule, Maryland courts apply a risk-utility analysis in classic de-
1O8 See, e.g., Phillips v. Hardware Wholesalers, Inc., 762 F.2d 46, 48 (6th Cir. 1985)
(applying Michigan law and noting that one of the elements of plaintiff's prima facie case
is proving reasonable alternative design); Gawenda v. Werner Co., 932 F. Supp. 183, 187
(E.D. Mich. 1996) (same), affdd, 127 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir. 1997); Zettle v. Handy Mfg. Co.,
837 F. Supp. 222, 225 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd, 998 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1993); Reeves v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Scott v. Allen Bradley
Co., 362 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
109 See, e.g., Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 271 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich. 1978) (not-
ing that in certain res ipsa cases a plaintiff's burden of proof is satisfied where evidence is
presented from which the jury could infer that some defect attributable to the manufac-
turer caused the accident); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 301 N.W.2d
846, 848 (Mich. CL App. 1980) (citing Holloway with approval); Messer v. Floyd Rice Ford,
Inc., 284 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Mich. CL App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 288 N.W.2d 352
(Mich. 1980) (same).
110 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976).
111 Id. at 956.
112 Id. at 959.
113 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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sign cases that requires the plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative
design to establish defective design. 114
Colorado has explicitly rejected the consumer expectations test as
an independent standard for determining defective design for many
of the reasons set forth earlier in the discussion. 1 5 Instead, it has
embraced risk-utility balancing as the only method that allows a court
to consider the broad range of factors necessary to make a determina-
tion as to whether a product design is reasonably safe.116 In Armen-
trout v. FMC Corp.,117 the Colorado high court reaffirmed its
commitment to risk-utility balancing and placed the burden of prov-
ing that a design was unreasonably dangerous on the plaintiff.118 The
court then considered whether evidence of a reasonable alternative
design is necessary to establish a prima facie case for defect. It noted
that plaintiff had, in fact, presented evidence of a reasonable altema-
tive design.119 In dictum, the court could not resist the temptation to
raise the possibility that a design might be so egregiously dangerous
that it would be defective even if no alternative design was available.' 20
As noted earlier, such a limited exception for cases in which the risk-
utility imbalance is enormous does not threaten the general liability
standard.1' 1
114 See, e.g., Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 539 A.2d 701, 707 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988):
In order to create ajury issue on Kawasaki's liability for a defective design,
Ziegler was required but failed to produce evidence showing "the techno-
logical feasibility of manufacturing a product with the suggested safety de-
vice at the time the suspect product was manufactured; the availability of
the materials required; the cost of production of the suggested device; price
to the consumer, including that of the suggested device; and the chances of
consumer acceptance of a model incorporating such features."
(quoting Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg., 488 A.2d 516, 519-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985));
Troja, 488 A.2d at 519-20 (upholding a directed verdict for defendant on grounds that
plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of a reasonable alternative design).
115 See Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1245-47 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
116 See id. at 1247; see also White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 867 P.2d 100, 105 (Colo. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that the risk-benefit test, with consideration of scientific and technical data
for alternative designs as one factor, is required in order to find a truck gasoline tank
design unreasonably dangerous).
117 842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
118 Id. at 183-84.
119 Id. at 185.
120 The court initially stated that "the existence of a feasible alternative (design] is a
factor in the risk-benefit analysis of the unreasonable dangerousness of the product de-
sign." Id. at 185. The court qualified this statement immediately in a footnote with a
citation to language from Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978)
(en banc) (quoted supra note 87), which allows for a finding of defective design without a
reasonable alternative design when a product has negligible social utility and extremely
high risk. Armentrout 842 P.2d at 185 n.11.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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Pennsylvania has, by common agreement, developed a unique
and, at times, almost unfathomable approach to products litigation.1 22
Notwithstanding its idiosyncratic approach to the subject, a quite plau-
sible view is that Pennsylvania does require proof of a feasible alterna-
tive design in classic design cases. 123 The leading decision is Azzarello
v. Black Bros. Co.,124 which held that the trial court should perform
risk-utility balancing in determining whether, as a matter of social pol-
icy, the product design can be considered defective. 125 Only after the
court decides the risk-utility issue in the plaintiff's favor should a
judge submit the case to thejury. Pennsylvania stands alone in its view
that risk-utility balancing is never properly a jury function. In any
event, both state and federal courts applying Azzarello have held that
risk-utility balancing demands that plaintiffs introduce evidence of a
feasible alternative design. Failure of plaintiffs to make such offers
has led to a host of decisions holding in favor of defendants as a mat-
ter of law.126 Pennsylvania case law confirms the thesis of this Article
122 SeeJAmrs A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TwERs~i, PRODUCTS LiABiLrry. PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS 507-09 (3d ed. 1997); see also Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test forDesign
Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 636-39
(1980) (describing the approach as "unacceptable and unprincipled"); StephenJ. Cipolla,
Comment, Returning the "Balance" to Design Defect Litigation in Pennsylvania: A Critique of
Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company, 89 DicK. L. REv. 149 (1984) (critiquing the Penn-
sylvania approach); Robert F. Harchut, Recent Development, 24 VLL. L. REv. 1035, 1048-
50 (1979) (describing the uncertainty of the approach).
123 See, e.g., Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1991) (reasoning
that if no reasonable alternative design for a forklift were known at the time of manufac-
ture, that design could not be defective).
124 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978).
125 Id. at 1026-27. Although the court held that risk-utility balancing was for the trial
court, it mandated the following jury instruction:
The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The product
must, therefore, be provided with every element necessary to make it safe
for [its intended] use, and without any condition that makes it unsafe for
[its intended] use. If you find that the product, at the time it left the defen-
dant's control, lacked any element necessary to make it safe for [its in-
tended] use or contained any condition that made it unsafe for [its
intended] use, then the product was defective, and the defendant is liable
for all harm caused by such defect.
Id. at 1027 n.12 (alterations in original). The instruction clearly does not reflect the ele-
ments necessary to make a prima facie risk-utility case that will survive a summary judgment
motion before a trial court.
126 See, e.g., Wallace v. Tesco Eng'g Inc., No. 94-2189, 1996 WL 92081, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 1, 1996), affd, 101 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 1996) (granting defense's directed verdict mo-
tion when employee who slipped and fell on oil brought claim of design defect of assembly
line for failing to have an adequate oil drainage system because the suggested alternative
design plaintiff offered was not safer); Fritchey v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., No. 95-1983, 1996
WL 240009, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 1996) (granting the defense's directed verdict motion
when worker slipped and fell on a colorless chemical in a waste water treatment plant
because plaintiff had presented no evidence that a safer reasonable alternative was avail-
able that would perform the design function and allow for coloration that would be visible
on a host of different types of floors in waste treatment plants); Ballarini v. Clark Equip.
Co., 841 F. Supp. 662, 665-66 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aft'd 96 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1996) (directing
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in two important respects. First, it supports the conclusion that a com-
mitment to isk-utility balancing leads inexorably to the requirement
that an alternative design must be available. Second, the crucial ques-
tion under Pennsylvania law is whether a plaintiff can make out a
prima facie case without proof of an alternative design, not the con-
tent of jury instructions. Thus, starting from a very different perspec-
tive on the role ofjudge and jury in design litigation, Pennsylvania law
supports the thesis that a feasible alternative design is a necessary
predicate to a valid design defect claim.
The California experience is especially instructive. Until fairly re-
cently, California was the most influential jurisdiction giving voice to
consumer expectations as an independent standard for defective de-
sign. It has now, for all practical purposes, abandoned that position
and adopted the consensus view based on risk-utility balancing. The
story is worth telling. In 1978, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,' 27 the
California Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs in design defect
cases may proceed independently on two alternative theories.128
A product design was defective if: (1) it failed to meet consumer
expectations, or (2) the risks inherent in the design outweighed
its benefits.129 On the latter issue, the court shifted the burden
of proof to the defendant. 30 Barker unleashed a firestorm of con-
troversy. It can fairly be said that the overwhelming majority of
courts and commentators have been sharply critical of Barker.'3'
verdict for defendant in a case in which plaintiff alleged that a forklift was defective be-
cause it did not come equipped with an interlock device that would put the vehicle into
neutral when the operator left the driver's seat, and concluding that plaintiff's expert
failed to establish the feasibility of an alternative design); see also Fitzpatrick v. Madonna,
623 A.2d 322, 323, 325-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (reversingjudgment for plaintiff in wrong-
ful death action in which the representatives of a swimmer killed by a propeller on a care-
lessly operated boat presented no evidence of a feasible alternative design).
127 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
128 Id. at 455.
129 See id. at 455-56.
130 Id. at 456.
131 Barkerwas sharply criticized on two grounds. First, it adopted a consumer expecta-
tions test for classic design defect cases. See supra text accompanying note 129. Second,
when a design is attacked on a risk-utility ground, it shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant to establish that a product's risks do not outweigh its benefits. See supra text
accompanying note 130. The post-Barker literature took issue with Barker on both of these
issues. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 122, at 602-14 (discussing problems with Barkers
approach); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: UnderstandingProducts Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435,
464-81 (1979) (same); John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionabiliy, 33
VaND. L. Rav. 551, 571-75 (1980) (same). For other scholarly criticism of the consumer
expectations test, see infra text accompanying notes 149-52. For judicial criticism of the
consumer expectations test, see cases cited supra notes 87-126. Courts have overwhelm-
ingly rejected shifting the burden to the defendant on the risk-utility issue. See, e.g., Ar-
mentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 182 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (stating that "the
plaintiffs bear the burden"); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 740 (Haw.
1983) (same); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 278 (Mass. 1984) (same); Kallio v. Ford
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Indeed, only a few states have adopted the Barker formula-
tion.132
In 1994, in Soule v. General Motors Corp.,l33 the California high
court recounted its travails with the consumer expectations test under
Barker and found the test unsuitable for cases involving product de-
signs of any complexity.1 4 The court in Soule held that it would there-
after countenance use of a limited consumer expectations test in cases
"in which the everyday experience of the product's users permits a con-
clusion that the product's design violated minimum safety assump-
tions."'1 5 In a footnote, the court sought to enlighten the reader as to
the kinds of design cases in which the consumer expectations test
could be used:
For example, the ordinary consumers of modern automobiles
may and do expect that such vehicles will be designed so as not to
explode while idling at stoplights, experience sudden steering or
brake failure as they leave the dealership, or roll over and catch fire
in two-mile-per-hour collisions. If the plaintiff in a product liability
action proved that a vehicle's design produced such a result, the
jury could find forthwith that the car failed to perform as safely as
its ordinary consumers would expect, and was therefore
defective.' 3 6
These examples are identical to the examples used earlier in this Arti-
cle in connection with "demonstrably defective designs."'' 37 Thus, Cal-
ifornia clearly limited the consumer expectations test to res ipsa-like
cases that do not require the application of a general standard to de-
Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. 1987) (same); Cremeans v. International Harvester
Co., 452 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ohio 1983) (same); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 579 P.2d
1287, 1287-88 (Or. 1978) (on rehearing) (same); Ray v. BIG Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 532-33
(Tenn.), modified, 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
132 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880-87 (Alaska 1979); Ontai,
659 P.2d at 740; Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982). Only Cater-
pilar has agreed with California that the defendant ought to bear the burden of proof on
risk-utility balancing. Caterpillar, 593 P.2d at 885-86.
13 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
L34 Id. at 304-10.
'35 Id. at 308.
136 Id. at 308 n.3.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 21-25; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
16, § 3 cmt. b, illus. 3:
Mary purchased a new automobile. She drove the car 1,000 miles with-
out incident. One day she stopped the car at a red light and leaned back to
rest until the light changed. Suddenly the seat collapsed backward, causing
Mary to hit the accelerator and the car to shoot out into oncoming traffic
and collide with another car. Mary suffered harm in the ensuing collision.
As a result of the collision, Mary's car was set afire, destroying the seat as-
sembly. The incident resulting in the harm is of a kind that ordinarily oc-
curs as a result of product defect. Mary need not establish whether the seat
assembly contained a manufacturing defect or a design defect.
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termine defective design. For all the rest-what are here referred to
as classic design cases-risk-utility balancing is mandated.
Having cast its lot with risk-utility balancing as the governing stan-
dard for classic design cases, the court in Soule then endorsed the posi-
tion originally taken in Barker that the burden of proof that a product
met risk-utility guidelines should fall on the defendant. Barker argued
that:
Because most of the evidentiary matters which may be relevant to
the determination of the adequacy of a product's design under the
"risk-benefit" standard-e.g., the feasibility and cost of alternative
designs-are similar to issues typically presented in a negligent de-
sign case and involve technical matters peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the manufacturer, we conclude that once the plaintiff
makes a prima facie showing that the injury was proximately caused
by the product's design, the burden should appropriately shift to
the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that the
product is not defective.13 8
This burden-shifting aspect of Barker is unique to California and
many observers, including the authors of this Article, have criticized
it.139 Ironically, however, in the context of an attempt to determine
what general standard is applicable in determining design defective-
ness, the burden shift supports the authors' thesis that proof regard-
ing an alternative design is necessary. As the quoted excerpt makes
dear, shifting the burden makes sense only if the defendant is re-
quired to prove that no marginal improvement to the challenged de-
sign was reasonable. If the risk-utility balancing countenanced in
Barker/Soule was broad enough to include a challenge to the general
utility of a product category and its overall value to society, the manu-
facturer would have no comparative advantage in showing that a prod-
uct as a whole was good or bad. That information is not "peculiarly
within the knowledge of the manufacturer." It follows that, for the
court's rationale in the quoted excerpt from Barker to make sense, the
focus must be on the availability-or unavailability-of a reasonable
alternative design.
The five jurisdictions selected for discussion are representative of
case law throughout the country. When the facts allow a court to draw
a common-sense inference of defect, the courts find no need to articu-
138 Barker, 573 P.2d at 455.
139 See supra note 131; see alsoJames A. Henderson, Jr., RenewedJudicial Controversy Over
Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MNeN. L. REv.
773, 784-97 (1979) (commenting that Barker's burden-shifting is a radical departure from
product liability tradition that, applied literally, will lead to inconsistent results); Aaron D.
Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for
Resolution, 18 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 575, 580-85 (1985) (arguing that the Barker test leads to
an unmanageable system of liability with inconsistent results).
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late a general liability standard. When design defect is demonstrable,
courts draw a res ipsa-like inference of defect. In the classic design
case, courts resort to risk-utility balancing. Where a reasonable alter-
native design is not available, the defendant prevails. Some courts, in
dicta, hold out the possibility that the isk-utility imbalance might be
so egregious that the product should not be marketed at all.140 Actual
holdings to this effect, however, are non-existent.141 Thus, for in what
are here described as classic design defect cases, courts impose liabil-
ity only if the plaintiff's proof shows that a reasonable alternative de-
sign that would have prevented the plaintiff's harm was available to
the manufacturer. A consensus to this effect has been achieved.
C. Most American Legal Scholars Agree That the General
Standard for Defective Design Is Risk-Utility with a
Requirement of Proof of Reasonable Alternative
Design
In assessing scholarly treatments of the appropriate general stan-
dard for design defect, the important variable is when the commen-
tary was made. From 1992 through 1997, the ALI undertook to
prepare a Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.'42 Early in that
project, it became clear that the general standard for design defect
that the ALI favored was the risk-utility standard coupled with a rea-
140 See supra note 120; see also Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga.
1994) (stating that a reasonable alternative design standard governs "since it is only at their
most extreme that design defect cases reflect the position that a product is simply so dan-
gerous that it should not have been made available at all"); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407
N.W.2d 92, 96-97 n.8 (Minn. 1982) ("Conceivably, rare cases may exist where the product
may be judged unreasonably dangerous because it should be removed from the market
rather than be redesigned.").
141 The authors have searched without success for cases where courts have held that a
product should not have been marketed due to egregious risk-utility imbalance. Cf supra
Part Ill.A.4 (noting the authors' skepticism that these cases would arise); supra notes 71-72
and accompanying text (same). Section 2A:58C-3(b) of the NewJersey statutes provides
that the obligation to establish a "practical and technically feasible alternative design" is
not required when a court makes all the following determinations based on clear and
convincing evidence:
(1) The product is egregiously unsafe or ultra-hazardous;
(2) The ordinary user or consumer of the product cannot reasonably be
expected to have knowledge of the product's risks, or the product poses a
risk of serious injury to persons other than the user or consumer; and
(3) The product has little or no usefulness.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(b) (West 1987). Appended to the legislation is an official com-
mentary by the NewJersey SenateJudiciary Committee that indicates just how limited the
exception was intended to be. The commentary notes: "It is intended that such a finding
[under the exception] would be made only in genuinely extraordinary cases-for exam-
ple, in the case of a deadly toy marketed for use by young children, or of a product mar-
keted for use in dangerous criminal activities." NJ. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. STATEMENT,
No. 2805-L.1987, ch. 197. Not a single reported case utilizes this statute to impose liability.
142 The authors were appointed as Reporters for the Restatement in June, 1992. See
supra note 16 for action taken by the ALI in approving the Proposed Final Draft.
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sonable alternative design requirement. In direct response to the Re-
statement (Second)'s treatment of design defects, many articles were
published in law reviews in the mid-1990s. 143 Often by their own ad-
mission, these pieces were produced in an effort to influence the pro-
cess of deliberation that led to final approval of the Proposed Final
Draft by the ALI membership in May of 1997.14 While these efforts
to influence the debate were perfectly legitimate in the context of de-
liberation on the Restatement (Third), their pointedly adversarial nature
(and hence the greater-than-normal possibility of traditional scholarly
objectivity having been tainted with political bias) warrants the exer-
cise of caution in attempting to gauge scholarly reactions to the un-
derlying issues. In light of this reality, the treatment of scholarship in
this section is limited to work published prior to 1994. Assessment of
the work published thereafter, in direct response to the Restatement
(Third), will be deferred to a subsequent discussion of the Restatement
(Third) itself.145
Commentaries written prior to the Restatement (Third) project, and
thus deserving of the traditional presumption of scholarly objectivity,
143 See articles cited supra notes 1, 9, 14; see also Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical Liabil-
ity: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 385, 402-14 (1995) (arguing that
categorical liability should not be part of the product liability system because it does not
effectively eliminate the manufacture or sale of products that are unavoidably dangerous
and does not rationally distribute the costs involved); Howard Klemme, Comments to the
Reporters and Selected Members of the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Prod-
ucts Liability, 61 TENN. L. Rav. 1173 (1994) (arguing that Reporters and Advisers, as well as
the Council, should not abandon dominant case law by introducing fault into modem
products liability law through requiring negligence in design defect cases); Joseph W. Lit-
ie, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict Liability Actions for Defectively Designed
Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189, 1194-99 (1994) (maintaining that strict liability should
apply only to products that are abnormally dangerous in design, and that the jury should
decide whether the product falls within this limited class); Marshall S. Shapo, A New Legisla-
tion: Remarks on the Draft Restatement of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH.J.L. RFxoRM 215, 217-
20 (1997) (arguing that the ALI and its reporters are advocating different political posi-
tions in what had been an area traditionally regarded as private law); Frank J. Vandall,
Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation Is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MIcH. J.L. REFoRm 261, 279 (1997) (arguing
that the Restatement (Third)'s treatment of design defects rests on political agendas, not case
law and policy analysis); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Categoy
Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429, 1434-
40 (1994) (concluding that proof of an alternative feasible design as a prerequisite to re-
covery in a product liability action is neither an advisable nor necessary change, and could
lead to a product being found defective even without any way to eliminate danger).
144 For example, Professor Shapo's article, Shapo, supra note 1, was published as a
preprint on March 30, 1995 and was widely distributed prior to the ALI Annual Meeting on
May 16-19, 1995 at which the Tentative Draft No. 2, including § 2(b) (the design defect
section), was being considered. Shapo's position in his advocacy piece is somewhat differ-
ent from his position in a treatise he wrote prior to the Restatement project. See infra note
148 and accompanying text.
145 See infra Part IV.C.
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support overwhelmingly the risk-utility consensus described herein.146
Modem treatise writers support the reasonable alternative design stan-
dard. M. Stuart Madden concludes: "[T]he majority rule posits that
plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of defective design without
evidence of a technologically feasible, and practicable, alternative to
defendant's product that was available at the time of manufacture."' 47
Marshall Shapo observes: "Among the principal methods of judicial
control over jury intuitions that would generate seriously uneconomic
conceptions of [design] defect is the requirement that the plaintiff
show a reasonable alternative design."1 48
146 See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 45, §§ 31, 96, at 149, 644-45 (defining the standard of
conduct in negligence as a balancing of "the risk,... probability and extent of the harm,
against the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect, and the expedience
of the course pursued" and writing that in the area of design defect, a manufacturer's
liability appears to be "essentially a matter of negligence"); Page Keeton, Product Liability
and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S LJ. 30, 39 (1973) ("But if defect is to be a require-
ment, it is submitted that there is no way to avoid a risk-benefit analysis in passing upon
designs."); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
CuMB. L. REV. 293, 313 (1979) (proposing that a product be determined defectively
designed "if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the danger...
outweighs the utility of the design"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive
Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 553-54 (1985) (endorsing the
use of risk-utility analysis in design defect cases); Schwartz, supra note 131, at 464 (com-
menting that "[t]here can be little doubt about the correctness of the risk-benefit standard
for design defect"); Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive
Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 803 (1983) (noting that "[m]ost of the modem design defect
cases rely on a risk-benefit liability standard that seems to be a strong assertion of the
negligence formula set forth in 1947 by Learned Hand in his effort to codify traditional
negligence reasoning") (footnote omitted); Wade, supra note 73, at 836-38 (setting out
factors to be used in the risk-benefit analysis); see also Birnbaum, supra note 122, at 649
("Imposing a negligence standard for design defect liability is in many cases only to define
in a coherent fashion what litigants are in fact arguing and what jurors are in essence
analyzing... [I]t is time for courts to adopt... a pure negligence/risk-utility test in
design defect cases."); Victor E. Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview,
33 VAND. L. REv. 579, 586 (1980) (writing that the Uniform Act has adopted a standard for
design defect cases that "balances risk against utility").
Finally, for whatever weight one chooses to give it, in numerous writings prior to our
appointment as Reporters, we found risk-utility to be the only viable test for design defect.
SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 4024 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 COR.NELL L. REv. 1512, 1532-34 (1992);James A. Hen-
derson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing The Future of American Products Liability Law, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332, 1334 (1991).
147 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODucTs LuBxrrY, § 8.3, at 299 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp.
1995).
148 SHAo, supra note 29, § 9.14[2]. Interestingly, this same author advanced a some-
what different position in an advocacy piece written in an attempt to influence public
opinion against the Restatement (Third) project while the AlI was considering it. Shapo,
supra note 1, at 665-66 ("A lamentable defect in the reporters' analysis lies in its downgrad-
ing of consumer expectations .... Driven by their certainty that 'risk-utility' is the sole
central element for determining defect, the reporters insist that 'consumer expectations
do not constitute an independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product de-
signs.'"); cf supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (discussing the possibly biased
scholarship of commentators, particularly Shapo).
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Although a small core of scholars have supported the consumer
expectations test over the years, 149 a far greater number of scholars
have sharply criticized the test as an independent general standard for
design defect. Thus, Professor Gary Schwartz notes that "[t]he [con-
sumer expectations] thesis works well if the 'portrayal' is concrete
enough to entail a U.C.C. express warranty or a Restatement product
representation. Absent this concreteness, the thesis does not easily
test out."150 The Prosser and Keeton treatise makes the following
points about the consumer expectation test:
The meaning is ambiguous and the test is very difficult of appli-
cation to discrete problems. What does the reasonable purchaser
contemplate? In one sense, he does not "expect" to be adversely
affected by a risk or hazard unknown to him. In another sense, he
does contemplate the "possibility" of unknown "side effects." In a
sense the ordinary purchaser cannot reasonably expect anything
more than that reasonable care in the exercise of the skill and
knowledge available to design engineers has been exercised. The
test can be utilized to explain most any result that a court or jury
chooses to reach. The application of such a vague concept in many
situations does not provide much guidance for a jury.151
Professor Mary Davis concludes: "Few courts adhere closely to the let-
ter of section 402A's consumer expectations test in proving design de-
fect. The test has proved unworkable for a variety of reasons."'152
149 See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for
Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REv. 465 passim (1978) (arguing
that liability for product-related injuries should be apportioned in accordance with reason-
able expectations); Shapo, supra note 39, at 1368-69 (arguing that a manufacturer's por-
trayal of its product should determine the context of its liability).
150 Schwartz, supra note 131, at 476 n.241.
151 KEETON Er AL., supra note 56, § 99, at 699 (footnote omitted).
152 MaryJ. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE
L. REv. 1217, 1236 (1993); see also 1 MADDEN, supra note 147, § 6.23 (Supp. 1995) (entitled
The Retreat of the Consumer Expectations Test); John Neely Kennedy, The Role of the Consumer
Expectation Test Under Louisiana's Products Liability Tort Doctrine, 69 TUL. L. REv. 117, 143
(1994) ("[T]he deficiencies of the consumer expectation test are considerable."). Interest-
ingly, a leading scholar writing from the British/Commonwealth perspective reaches the
same conclusion: "By the early 1980s the inappropriate and unsupportable 'consumer ex-
pectations' test had been supplanted in most U.S. jurisdictions by an approach openly
based on balancing a product's costs and benefits-in other words, the balance between its
risks and its utility." JANE STAPLETON, PRODucr La Birr 236 (1994).
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RECENT WORK OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTI7TUTE:
THE P]s'AEAmvT (TmwR) oF TORTS."
PRODUCTS LL4B1f
A. What the New Restatement Says About the General Standard
for Defective Design
At its annual meeting in May of 1997, the ALI formally approved
the Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement (Third).153 Subsection (b)
of section 2 defines defective design in a manner consistent with the
consensus position this Article describes:
§ 2. Categories of Product Defect
A product...
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribu-
tion, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe.' 54
Comment b to section 2 makes clear that the subsection 2(b) defini-
tion provides the general, but not exclusive, standard for defective de-
sign. 155 References in comment b to sections 3 and 4, and in
comment e to section 2,156 reflect earlier discussions in this Article. 157
Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) provides what was earlier described
as a res ipsa inference of defect when a product fails to perform safely
153 See supra note 16.
154 REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 16, § 2(b).
155 Comment b first appeared in the Proposed Final Draft. The comment calls atten-
tion to sections of the Restatement that do not require proof of a reasonable alternative
design:
b. The nonexcusivenes of the definitions of defect in this Section. When a
plaintiff seeks recovery under the general rule of liability in § 1, in most
instances the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of product defect by
satisfying the requirements of § 2. Section 2 is not, however, the exclusive
means by which the plaintiff may establish liability in a products case based
on the general rule in § 1. Some courts, for example, while recognizing
that in most cases involving defective design the plaintiff must prove the
availability of a reasonable alternative design, also observe that such proof is
not necessary in every case involving design defects. Sections 3 and 4 and
Comment e to § 2 provide other approaches to the establishment of defec-
tive design under §§ 1 and 2(b).
When § 2(b) is read in conjunction with these other provisions which
allow for other avenues for determining defective design, it reflects the sub-
stantial body of case law which suggests that reasonable alternative design is
the predominant, yet not exclusive, method for establishing defective
design.
Id. § 2 cmt. b.
156 See supra note 155.
157 See supra Part I.
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its manifestly intended function.15 8 Inferences of defect based on
product malfunction obviate the need to apply the general design
standard, thereby rendering that subset of design cases relatively easy
to decide. Section 4, dealing with violations of statutory and regula-
tory safety standards, also makes determinations of defective design
relatively easy.159 Comment e to section 2, also referred to in com-
ment b,160 recognizes the possibility that a product design that com-
bines an egregiously high risk of injury and a negligible social utility
might be found defective even if no reasonable alternative design
were available. 1 1 Moreover, in addition to these sources of flexibility
in the Restatement (Third) approach to defining defective design, the
158 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 16, § 3:
§ 3 Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused
by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without
proof of a specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff.
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect;
and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.
159 Id. § 4 (noting that "a product's noncompliance with an applicable... statute...
renders the product defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the stat-
ute"). See generally Teresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Strik-
ing the Right Balance Between the Two, 30 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORm 431, 450-51 (1997)
(discussing the per se rule for noncomplying products).
160 See supra note 155.
161 RFsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 16, § 2 cmt. e:
Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonable design. Several courts
have suggested that the designs of some products are so manifestly unrea-
sonable, in that they have low social utility and high degree of danger, that
liability should attach even absent proof of a reasonable alternative design.
In large part the problem is one of how the range of relevant alternative
designs is described. For example, a toy gun that shoots hard rubber pel-
lets with sufficient velocity to cause injury to children could be found to be
defectively designed within the rule of Subsection (b). Toy guns unlikely to
cause injury would constitute reasonable alternatives to the dangerous toy.
Thus, toy guns that project ping pong balls, soft gelatin pellets, or water
might be found to be reasonable alternative designs to a toy gun that shoots
hard pellets. However, if the realism of the hard-pellet gun, and thus its
capacity to cause injury, is sufficiently important to those who purchase and
use such products to justify the court's limiting consideration to toy guns
that achieve realism by shooting hard pellets, then no reasonable alterna-
tive will, by hypothesis, be available. In that instance, the design feature
that defines which alternatives are relevant-the realism of the hard-pellet
gun and thus its capacity to injure--is precisely the feature on which the
user places value and of which the plaintiff complains. If a court were to
adopt this characterization of the product, and deem the capacity to cause
injury an egregiously unacceptable quality in a toy for use by children, it
could conclude that liability should attach without proof of a reasonable
alternative design. The court would declare the product design to be defec-
tive and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of danger
posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible
social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant
facts, would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the product.
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Restatement (Third) also addresses special products and product mar-
kets to which the general standard in subsection 2(b) may not
apply.16 2
Given that the authors of this Article were the Reporters on the
Restatement (Third) project, citing the Restatement (Third) in this context
may appear tantamount to the authors citing themselves in support of
their own conclusions. In truth, however, such a view enormously ex-
aggerates the extent to which Reporters can influence the content of
Restatements on which they work. This is certainly true with respect
to those pivotally important, potentially controversial aspects of the
projects, such as the issue of design defect in this project. To appreci-
ate the extent to which the Restatement (Third) is, in every sense, a
group effort, it is necessary to understand the process by which it
came into being. Several important groups from within the ALI mem-
bership advised and assisted the Reporters during the five-year pro-
ject.163 The Reporters met with one group or another in formal
sessions at least six times each year and presented drafts at Annual
Meetings in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997.16 Altogether, a dozen soft-
cover formal drafts were published separately and circulated widely
among ALI members and interested observers over the life of the pro-
ject. These drafts were discussed, debated, criticized, and revised.' 65
The Reporters received and considered thousands of written sugges-
tions and spent countless hours discussing every conceivable aspect of
the project in person and on the telephone. The Reporters ex-
amined, classified, anid relied on thousands of reported appellate
court decisions and statutes as the basis for the black-letter rules and
supporting comments. 166 This research was circulated widely to and
critiqued by ALI members and interested observers. The effect of all
162 The Restatement (Third) contains a separate topic (Chapter 1, Topic 2) entitled Lia-
bility Rules Applicable to Special Products or Product Markets, containing four sections. Section5
covers product components; § 6 covers prescription drugs and medical devices; § 7 covers
food products; and § 8 covers used products. R.STATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 16, §§ 5-8.
163 The formally constituted groups included Advisers, a Members Consultative
Group, Bar Liaison Groups, and the AL Council.
164 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TomTs: PRODUrs Lukmrr (April 12, 1994) [hereinafter
Tentative Draft No. 1] was presented at the Annual Meeting on May 17-20, 1994; RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucrs LL &iu (March 13, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative
Draft No. 2] was presented at the Annual Meeting on May 16-19, 1995; RErSATEmENT
(THID) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS L .ABiur (April 5, 1996) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 3]
was presented at the Annual Meeting on May 14-17, 1996; Proposed Final Draft (April 1,
1997), RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 16, was approved at the Annual Meeting on May
20, 1997.
165 For each of the four years in which the Reporters presented tentative drafts to the
Annual Meeting, the following drafts were prepared: (1) Preliminary Draft (2) Council
Draft, and (3) Tentative Draft. Each of the aforementioned drafts was presented to each of
the groups identified supra note 163.
166 Voluminous Reporters' Notes, setting forth the authorities on which the Reporters
relied, accompany the Restatement (Third).
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this consultation and debate on the content of the project was sub-
stantial.167 One can more accurately view the Reporters as the carriers
of the Restatement (Third)'s message rather than as its authors.
B. Close But No Cigar: The Puzzling Reception of the
Restatement (Third) in Connecticut
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Connecticut reveals
how analytical errors and rhetorical overstaqements can lead to ill-ad-
vised conclusions. In Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 168 respond-
ing to defendant's overly aggressive reliance on an earlier draft of the
Restatement (Third), the Connecticut high court purported to reject the
"feasible alternative design" standard. 16 9 However, the decision
reveals that the Connecticut court actually came within a whisker of
endorsing the structure for design litigation set forth in the Restate-
ment. Potter involved injuries to employees who had for more than two
decades used pneumatic hand tools manufactured by the defen-
dant.170 Plaintiffs suffered vascular and neurologic injuries allegedly
caused by excessive vibration. 17' Plaintiffs' qualified experts testified
about a broad range of design alternatives for reducing vibration in
pneumatic tools that the defendant could have adopted. 72 Plaintiffs
also introduced credible expert testimony that a large number of de-
fendant's tools violated specific industry safety standards aimed at re-
ducing vibration.' 7 3 Understandably enough, the trial court gave the
design claims to the jury and the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiffs. 74
167 In addition to countless stylistic changes, significant substantive changes came
about from the debate. For example, Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 164, § 3 applied
only to manufacturing defects. Based on group discussions, this section was substantially
broadened to include both manufacturing and design defects when a product fails to per-
form its manifestly intended function. See supra note 158; supra text accompanying notes
21-25. Tentative Draft No. 1 did not provide for liability without a reasonable alternative
design when the product presented negligible social utility and an extremely high degree
of risk. Comment e to § 2 of the Restatement (Third) recognizes the possibility of such liabil-
ity. See supra note 161; supra text accompanying notes 70-72. Tentative Draft No. 1 did not
deal in any significant way with the liability of component part sellers. After much discus-
sion, a separate section now addresses the issue. See RSTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 16,
§ 5. For a discussion of the differences between early tentative drafts and the Restatement
(Third), see Aaron D. Twerski, Inside the Restatement, 24 PEPP. L. Rxv. 839, 840-52 (1997)
(describing the drafting process and tracing the res ipsa inference and the development of
the manifestly unreasonable design basis for liability).
168 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).
169 Id. at 1332.
170 Id. at 1324.
171 See id. at 1325.
172 See id. at 1326.
173 See id.
174 See id.
[Vol. 83:867
DEFECTIVE PRODUCT DESIGN
On its facts, the claims in the Potter case were clearly for the jury
under the alternative design provision of the Restatement (Third).175 In
any event, the defendant appears to have argued on appeal that proof
of an alternative design is an "absolute" requirement in a design case
and that the plaintiffs had failed to introduce such proof.'7 6 Of
course, as previous discussions make clear,177 the defendant was
wrong on both counts. Under the Restatement (Third), proof of an al-
ternative design is not required in every case; 178 and, in any event, the
plaintiff's proof of feasible, safer alternatives was more than adequate.
But given the defendant's apparent insistence that the Restatement
(Third) imposes an "absolute" requirement in this regard, the court
rejected both the defendant's argument and the early draft of the Re-
statement (Third).179
That the Connecticut Supreme Court's analysis is, in actuality,
consistent with the Restatement (Third) is clear from the court's consid-
eration of the circumstances in which proof of a reasonable alterna-
tive design is not necessary. The opinion identifies two such
circumstances: (1) when a product malfunctions, failing to perform
safely its manifestly intended function; 80 and (2) when a product de-
sign is so egregiously dangerous that it should not be sold at all, even
if a reasonable alternative design is not available.' 8 ' As set forth ear-
lier, 8 2 the Restatement (Third) explicitly embraces both of these posi-
tions. Product malfunction is recognized in section 3,183 and the
"should not be sold at all" possibility is recognized in comment e to
section 2.184 It follows that the court's refusal in Potter to adopt the
general design standard in the Restatement (Third) is based on a mis-
reading of the relevant texts.'8 5
175 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), suPra note 16, § 2 cmt. f:
While plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative design would
have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm, Subsection (b) does not re-
quire the plaintiff to actually produce a prototype in order to make out a
prima facie case. For example, even though an expert has produced no
prototype, qualified expert testimony on the issue suffices if it reasonably
supports the conclusion that a reasonable alternative design could have
been practically adopted at the time of sale.
176 Potter, 694 A.2d at 1327.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 153-62, 172.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 153-62.
179 Potter, 694 A.2d at 1333.
180 See id. at 1332.
181 See id.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
183 See supra note 158.
184 See supra note 161.
185 At one point, the majority opinion cites, with apparent approval, a number of law
review articles that are critical of the Restatement (Third)'s treatment of defective design.
Potter, 694 A.2d at 1329 & n.7. Not surprisingly, these include the critics to whom this
Article responds in the next section. See infra Part 1V.C. If the reader is persuaded that
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The Potter court's discussion of the theoretical basis for its deci-
sion reflects the rhetorical confusion that has characterized much of
the case law concerning defective design. The opinion in Potter begins
by professing Connecticut's general allegiance to the consumer ex-
pectations test, citing substantial authority for that proposition. 186
The problem analytically is that none of the cases cited in the opinion
support the proposition for which they are cited.'8 7 The Potter major-
ity must have sensed that consumer expectations could not serve as a
general liability standard:
[W] e nevertheless recognize that there may be instances involving
complex product designs in which an ordinary consumer may not
be able to form expectations of safety. In such cases, a consumer's
expectations may be viewed in light of various factors that balance
the utility of the product's design with the magnitude of its risks.
We find persuasive the reasoning of those jurisdictions that have
modified their formulation of the consumer expectation test by in-
corporating risk-utility factors into the ordinary consumer expecta-
tion analysis. 188
Although the majority in Potter asserts otherwise, its holding inevitably
steers Connecticut toward the reasonable alternative design require-
ment set forth in the Restatement (Third). Indeed, this fact was not lost
on Justice Berdon who, in a separate concurring opinion, expressed
concern about this very issue. He pointed out that "adopting such a
risk-utility test for 'complex product designs' sounds dangerously
close to requiring proof of the existence of 'a reasonable alternative
design."'189
It follows that the reception given to the earlier draft of the Re-
statement (Third) by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Potter must
be counted as a false start. It appears that the defendant overreached
by insisting that the Restatement (Third) imposes an "absolute" require-
these critics mischaracterize the law governing defective design liability, then the Potter
court's reliance on those same critics casts further doubt on the soundness of the court's
conclusions.
186 Potter, 694 A.2d at 1330, 1332.
187 In total, the Potter court cites eight cases in which liability can be established based
either on "the consumer expectation standard" or on a common-sense inference of defect.
Id. Six of the eight invoke the principle set forth in § 3 of the Restatement (Third). See
Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp. 164, 183 (D. Conn.
1984); Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc. 364 A.2d 175 (Conn. 1975); Rossignol v. Danbury
School of Aeronautics, Inc., 227 A.2d 418 (Conn. 1967); Living & Learning Centre, Inc. v.
Griese Custom Signs, Inc., 491 A.2d 433, 435 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); Kileen v. General
Motors Corp., 421 A.2d 874, 875-76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980); and Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 A.2d 1254 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979). One case cited by the
court, Giglio v. Connecticut Light &Power Co., 429 A.2d 486 (Conn. 1980), is a classic failure
to warn action. Another, Wachtel v. Roso4 271 A.2d 84 (Conn. 1970), involves a manufac-
turing defect.
188 Potter, 694 A.2d at 1333 (citations omitted).
189 Id. at 1356 (Berdon, J., concurring).
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ment of reasonable alternative design, and the court overreacted by
rejecting that position in a case which, on its facts, clearly met the
alternative design requirement that the Restatement (Third) only contin-
gently imposes. Over time, with the opportunity to reflect on the is-
sues that this Article raises, one can only hope that the confusion
reflected in the Potter decision will dissipate.
C. Critiquing the Critics of the Restatement (Third)
While the ALI considered the Restatement (Third), several com-
mentaries were published that are sharply critical of the Restatements
treatment of the standard for determining whether a product design
is defective.1 90 More particularly, these commentaries criticize the Re-
statement (Third) for adopting a risk utility/alternative design standard,
claiming that a majority of American jurisdictions measure product
designs against an open-ended, consumer expectations standard. 191
At the time these critiques were published, the Reporters were preoc-
cupied with other matters. Now they wish to respond directly to these
critics. In large measure, the preceding Part of this Article provides
adequate response by demonstrating that the risk-utility standard of
the Restatement (Third) is clearly the majority position. However, lest
any doubt linger on the issue of whose readings of the relevant deci-
sions are correct, a point-by-point response will be undertaken.
Rather than be accused of selecting only the most erroneous portions
of the relevant analyses, the discussion that follows responds to the
case-law characterizations of these critics in exactly the same sequence
in which they appear, limiting responses to those instances in which
the writer claims that the Reporters have classified a particular juris-
diction's case law incorrectly.
In an article that appeared in 1994 in a symposium devoted to the
Restatement (Third),192 one author claims that the Restatement (Third)
proposes "a radical restructuring of products liability theory" dealing
with the subject of liability for defective designs.' 93 More specifically,
the author insists that the Reporters have misclassified a number of
opposing jurisdictions as supportive of the Restatement position.194
The first such jurisdiction is Illinois. 195 To support his reading of IMi-
190 See articles cited supra notes 1, 9, 14, 143.
191 See supra note 143.
192 A Symposium on the AL's Pr oposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
61 TENN. L. REv. 1043 (1994).
193 Vandall, supra note 1, at 1407.
194 ld at 1408.
195 The first state that Vandall discusses is Arkansas. Id. at 1409. The Reporters con-
cede in the final draft of the Restatement (Third) that Arkansas has adopted consumer expec-
tations as the general test. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 16, § 2, Reporters' Notes,
cmt. d, § II.D. The first state that Vandall characterizes differently from the Reporters is
Illinois. Vandall, supra note 1, at 1409-10.
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nois law, the author quotes from an intermediate appellate court
opinion:
"Our supreme court has never included the existence of a feasible
alternative design as one of the elements a plaintiff must prove in
order to succeed in a products liability case. In fact, in Palmer [v.
Avco Distributing Corp.], the supreme court ruled that evidence of an
alternative design is admissible as proof of one of the required
elements.
The supreme court in Palmer stated that the dangerousness of a
product is usually proved in one or both of two ways: either by intro-
ducing evidence that when the product was used in the customary
manner, injury resulted; or by introducing evidence of the existence
of a safer, feasible alternative design. Thus, the existence of an al-
ternative design becomes not an element of proof but instead
merely one method of proving one of the elements of proof-that
the product was unreasonably dangerous."196
On any objective reading of this quoted excerpt, when the opinion
speaks of injury resulting "when the product was used in the custom-
ary manner," the court is referring to those designs that this Article
classifies as demonstrably defective-designs that self-defeatingly fail
to perform their manifestly intended functions. Indeed, on its facts,
Palmer,197 the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to which the opinion
refers, supports the Restatement (Third) position. 198 In Palmer, the
court imposed liability based on plaintiff's proof of the availability of a
reasonable alternative design. 99 Any doubt that Illinois law supports
the Restatement's general design standard is eliminated by considera-
tion of a fact that the author in question chooses to ignore200-Illinois
196 Vandall, supra note 1, at 1410 (quoting Ogg v. City of Springfield, 458 N.E.2d 1331,
1339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)).
197 Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 412 N.E.2d 959 (I1. 1980).
198 In Palmer, the plaintiff was injured when his leg was caught in a farm machine. Id.
at 961.
199 Id. at 965.
200 Vandall dismisses statutes as sources of law for Restatement purposes. Vandal],
supra note 1, at 1408 & n.II (" J]urisdictions that adopt the reasonable alternative design
requirement through legislation should not be counted because this violates the founda-
tional premise of the American Law Institute."). The official position of the ALI on this
issue is quite the opposite. Statutes are legitimate sources upon which to base Restatement
provisions. See A. James Casner, Restatement (Second) of Property as an Instrument of Law
Reform, 67 IowA L. REv. 87, 90, 100 (1981) (discussing the use of legislative developments
in drafting the Restatement (Second) of Property); Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal
Change: Problems of Policy in the Restatement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. Louis LJ.
185 (1968); Herbert Wechsler, Address at the Annual Dinner of the American Law Insti-
tute (May 17, 1984), 61 A.L.I. PRoc. 408, 412-13 (1985) (noting the future importance of
legislation in the development of Restatements of Law).
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codified the reasonable alternative design standard by statute in 1993,
a year before the author's article appeared.20 1
The author argues next that the Reporters misclassified Minne-
sota law. 20 2 Once again the author's approach is to quote from an
appellate decision:
"Whether the trial court erred [in instructing the jury] de-
pends upon whether in a products liability alleged design defect
case a plaintiff must establish as an element of his case that at the
time of manufacture a safer, practicable, and technologically feasi-
ble alternative design existed-an issue of first impression for this
court...
.... The tenor, if not the literal wording, of the instructions
permitted the jury to consider availability of, and failure to use, an
alternative, safer design as a factor. However, Ford complains the
instructions didn't go far enough; that they should have informed
the jury that plaintiff had the burden to prove the existence of a
safer, feasible alternative design as an element of an alleged defec-
tive product design case. We disagree .... Although normally evi-
dence of a safer alternative design will be presented initially by the
plaintiff, it is not necessarily required in all cases. Such evidence is
relevant to, and certainly may be an important factor in, the deter-
mination of whether the product was unreasonably defective. How-
ever, existence of a safer, practical alternative design is not an
element of an alleged defective product design prima facie case."203
Several observations should suffice to demonstrate that the critic, not
the Reporters, misreads the Minnesota case law. First, the quoted case
does not involve the legal standard of sufficiency of proof for reaching
the jury, but rather the adequacy of the jury instructions; 20 4 in other
portions of the opinion, the court points out explicitly that the plain-
tiff introduced sufficient proof of a safer alternative.20 5 Second, the
quoted language to the effect that evidence of a safer alternative de-
201 735 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2104 (West Supp. 1997). In Best v. Taylor Machine
Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Il. 1997), the Illinois Supreme Court held the tort reform statute
to be unconstitutional as a violation of the state constitutional provision against "special
legislation." Id. at 1078, 1089. It is important to note that the court vacated the lower
court's holding that the provision requiring a plaintiff to establish a reasonable alternative
design was unconstitutional. Id. at 1105-06. However, the court held that the other provi-
sions of the bill which it found to be unconstitutional were essential to implement the
legislative policy behind the statute and could not be severed. Id. at 1104.
202 Vandall, supra note 1, at 1410-11.
208 Id. (quoting Kallo v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 94-97 (Minn. 1987)).
204 Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 96; see also supra Part IIIA.6 (explaining that it is erroneous to
rely on appellate decisions that approve jury instructions based on consumer expectations
to support the overall application of the standard).
205 Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 97 ("Sufficient evidence existed to support the conclusion
[the jury] reached [that a practical safer design was feasible].").
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sign is not "necessarily required in all cases"'20 6 is explained in a foot-
note which states that "conceivably, rare cases may exist where the
product may be judged unreasonably dangerous because it should be
removed from the market rather than be redesigned."207 This foot-
note is a direct reference to the theoretical possibility of an egre-
giously dangerous design, a possibility noted earlier in this Article20
and explicitly recognized in the Restatement (Third).20 9 And if all this
were not enough to prove the author wrong, a leading authority on
Minnesota tort law has concluded: "While Minnesota differs in minor
respects, Minnesota law in general seems to be consistent with the Re-
statement position on design defects."210
The author's next claim of Reporter error involves the law of
Washington. Once again, the author quotes from a reported opinion:
"Consistent with prior case law, this court determined that the avail-
ability of an alternative, safe design is a factor which may, rather
than must, be considered by ajury in deciding if a product is unrea-
sonably dangerous. We held that a plaintiff may establish that a
product is unreasonably dangerous by means of factors other than
the availability of alternative, safe designs."211
Admittedly, the reference to "factors other than the availability of al-
ternative, safe designs" is puzzling, coupled as it is with the court's
underlying connitment to determining whether a design is "unrea-
sonably dangerous."212 One possibility, of course, might be that the
reference is to consumer expectations. However, the Supreme Court
of Washington has repeatedly insisted that consumer expectations
means "reasonable expectations," defined explicitly in risk-utility
terms. 213 Moreover, a statute enacted in Washington in 1981 imposes
a reasonable alternative design requirement in connection with prov-
ing that defendant's design is "not reasonably safe," 214 and then ex-
206 See supra text accompanying note 203.
207 Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 97 n.8 (citing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322,
1328 n.5 (Or. 1978) (en banc)).
208 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
210 Mike Steenson, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and Minnesota Products Liability
Law: Liability Standards, 24 WM. MrrCHELL L. Rxv. 1 (1997). Steenson is the Reporter for
the Minnesota Civil Jury Instructions Guides.
211 Vandall, supra note 1, at 1412 (quoting Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728
P.2d 585, 588 (Wash. 1986)).
212 See supra text accompanying note 211.
213 E.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) (noting that
in determining reasonable expectations, a number of risk-utility factors must be consid-
ered); see also Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 660 (Wash. 1986) ("While usually
called a 'consumer expectations' test, the Tabert rule actually combines the consideration
of consumer expectations with an analysis of the risk and utility inherent in a product's
use.")
214 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030 (West 1992).
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plicitly states that, in determining whether a product is not reasonably
safe, "the trier of fact shall consider whether the product was unsafe to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer."215 The Restatement (Third) condones taking consumer ex-
pectations into account in determining the feasibility of an alternative
design.2 16
One way to reduce the rhetorical confusion is to observe that,
whatever else may be said, Washington courts are committed to a risk-
utility standard in which reasonable, safer alternative designs play a
major role. Moreover, the confusion in the published opinions is
greatest when they focus, as do all of the major reported design deci-
sions in Washington, on the relatively less important issue of the con-
tent of jury instructions rather than on the relatively more important
issue of what the plaintiff must prove to reach the jury.217 It is telling
that, in all of the classic design liability decisions in Washington pub-
lished to date, appellate courts have denied liability as a matter of law
whenever plaintiffs have failed to introduce sufficient proof of the
availability of reasonable alternative designs.218 Perhaps the fairest
judgment to reach at this point is that the Washington courts have
used unclear and confused language but have reached outcomes in
design cases that are consistent with the position adopted in the Re-
statement (Third). Certainly, it is unwarranted for the author to claim,
relying on dicta quoted out of context, that Washington courts apply
any other test than reasonable alternative design in judging the suffi-
ciency of the plaintiffs' proofs in these cases.
The next jurisdiction that the author considers, and the last that
this discussion will review, is Colorado. Colorado is so solidly commit-
ted to the position adopted in the Restatement (Third) that an informed
reader may find it surprising that the author would try to argue other-
wise.2 19 Again, the author repeats the prescribed pattern of quoting
appellate opinions out of context-here, from two Colorado Supreme
Court decisions. 220 In the first, the court refers to proof of a substi-
tute safer design as one of seven "factors" to be considered in deter-
mining whether a design is defective.221 The author relies on this
215 1&t § 7.72.030.(3).
216 RESrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 16, § 2 cmt. f.
217 See, e.g., Falk v. Keene Corp., 782 P.2d 974 (Wash. 1989); Couch v. Mine Safety
Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585 (Wash. 1986); Connor v. Skagit Corp., 664 P.2d 1208 (Wash.
1983).
218 See, e.g., Soproni v. Polygon Apt. Partners, 3 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 15,033
(Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1997); Novak v. Piggly Wiggly Puget Sound Co., 591 P.2d 791,
794-95 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
219 See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
220 Vandall, supra note 1, at 1413-15 (quoting Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175,
185 n.11 (Colo. 1992); Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Colo. 1987)).
221 See Camacho, 741 P.2d at 1247.
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reference to support his conclusion that the reasonable alternative de-
sign standard that this Article advances is merely one of a number of
factors determining defective design.2 22 However, as explained ear-
lier, this judicial reference to the early writings of Professor John
Wade does not support the author's conclusion. 223 Furthermore, it
certainly has not distracted Colorado courts from steadfastly applying
the reasonable alternative design standard advanced herein in judg-
ing the sufficiency of plaintiffs' proofs.224 In the second quotation
from Colorado on which the author relies to cast doubt on the state's
position, the high court first emphasizes the necessity of the plaintiffs
proving feasible safer alternatives in most cases 225 and then makes the
judicially irresistible gesture of alluding, in dictum, to the theoretical
possibility (in the court's own words, "[t]here might be cases") of a
design being so egregiously and gratuitously dangerous that it never
should have been marketed at all.22 6
Suffice it to say that the author's mischaracterizations of judicial
dicta, considered above in the same sequence in which they appear in
his article, do not support the author's claim that the Restatement
(Third) constitutes a "radical restructuring" of products liability law on
the subject of liability for defective design. Other published criticisms
of the Restatement's position on defective design warrant the same con-
clusion. One such critic appears to believe that quantity is as impres-
sive as quality in these matters. In an article that is nearly five-
hundred printed pages, the author purports to show the errors of the
Reporters' ways.227 The author first considers the law of Alabama.
The leading case in that state clearly and unequivocally adopts the
position adopted in the Restatement (Third)-that the plaintiff must
prove that a reasonable, safer alternative design was available that
would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff's harm. 228 Rather than
dispute this fact, the author attempts to explain it away by conceding
that "enhanced injury cases. . . naturally involve alternative designs,"
but then insisting that "'regu lar' design defect cases . . .impose no
such proof requirements." 229
A moment's reflection reveals that the author's concession that
enhanced injury cases "naturally involve alternative designs" consti-
tutes an unwitting admission that proof of an alternative design is nec-
essary in all classic design cases that do not fall within one or another
222 Vandall, supra note 1, at 1414.
223 See supra Part IIIAL1.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 115-21.
225 See Armentrout, 842 P.2d at 185.
226 Id. at 185 n.11.
227 See Vargo, supra note 14.
228 General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1188-89 (Ala. 1985).
229 Vargo, supra note 14, at 563.
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of the relatively narrow exceptions discussed earlier. The enhanced
injury cases to which the author makes reference involve claims that
the designs in question-typically motor vehicle designs-lack safety
features that would have reduced, but not necessarily eliminated, the
plaintiff's injuries.23 0 Enhanced injury cases are, on any view, remark-
able. But what makes them remarkable is not the enhancement of
injury, but the question of what a court should do when the plaintiff
cannot quantify the amount of defect-caused enhancement. Alabama
adopts the majority position on this causation issue that when quanti-
fication of the extent of causal enhancement is not possible, the plain-
tiff may recover for all of the injuries suffered in the product-related
accident. 23 ' But on the issue of what the plaintiff must show to prove
that the design is defective, all classic design cases are enhancement
cases in the sense that the plaintiff must prove that a design defect in
the form of lack of a safety feature caused some, or all, of the plain-
tiff's harm.
Thus, the "regular" design cases to which the author refers as a
separate category are, properly viewed, nothing more than classic de-
sign cases in which the plaintiff happens to be able to quantify the
hann that the design defect caused by proving that the lack of a safety
feature caused all of the harm, notjust a nonquantifiable portion of it.
But in all classic design cases, quite apart from the separate issue of
whether the plaintiff can quantify the element of causation, the plain-
tiff must show that the omission from the design of an available, alter-
native safety feature caused some portion of the injuries.23 2 It follows
that by conceding that enhanced injury cases "naturally involve alter-
native designs,"233 the author unwittingly concedes the very element
in the Restatement (Third) with which he purports to disagree: that in
classic cases the plaintiff must prove that the lack of a feasible, alterna-
tive safety feature in the design caused, in whole or in part, the inju-
ries suffered in the product-related accident.234 Finally, the critic
230 E.g., Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 227-28 (Iowa 1992) (involving an
injured plaintiff who claimed that a Jeep in which he was riding should have been
equipped with a metal top instead of a fiberglass one).
231 See generally Barry Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiff's Burden of Proving Enhanced
Injury in Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DE PAUL L. REv. 55, 61 (1989)
(stating that thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted this theory).
232 See, e.g., Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 659, 662 (Ga.
1992) (stating that in an enhanced injury case, plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
design defect was a substantial factor in producing additional damages).
233 See supra text accompanying note 229.
234 See supra Part III.B.
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ignores the simple fact that Alabama imposes the reasonable alterna-
tive design requirement in non-enhanced injury cases.23 5
One more critic of the Restatement (Third) deserves mention,23 6 if
only because of the harshness-indeed, the almost ad hominem qual-
ity-of the criticism.237 This last author's criticism is directed not so
much at the functional test adopted for determining defective design,
as at the doctrinal question of whether products liability cases sound
in negligence, warranty, or strict liability. The author claims that by
adopting fault as the basis for liability in cases involving allegedly de-
fective design and failure to warn, the ALI advisers and Council have
decided to follow their own "instrumentalist views" 238 and to reject
mainstream American products liability traditions.23 9 In making this
assertion, the author misreads not only American traditions, but the
Restatement (Third), as well. Comment n to section 2 is quite clear on
the relationship between functional and doctrinal analysis. So long as
the functional requisites of section 2 are satisfied, plaintiffs may couch
their design claims in negligence, implied warranty, or strict liability
in tort. 240
235 See, e.g., Bean v. BIC Corp., 597 So. 2d 1350, 1352 (Ala. 1992) (listing the feasibility
of an alternative design that averts danger as one of two factors to consider when imposing
a legal duty on manufacturers to make their products child-proof).
236 Klemme, supra note 143.
237 Klemme characterizes the Reporters' descriptions of the case law as "substantial
misrepresentations of the fact." Id. at 1174. He then shares these observations:
Frankly, as one who has long engaged in similar work as the reporter for
the Colorado Supreme Court Committee on Civil Jury Instructions, I can
only say that had I or the Committee offered such weak, and often contra-
dictory or irrelevant, authority to support the Committee's work, I would
never have survived as the Committee's reporter. Neither, I suspect, would
the Committee have so long enjoyed the high regard in which the bench
and bar of Colorado have held its work and the intellectual integrity on which it
is based
Id. at 1175 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The clear implication of Klemme's self-
congratulatory reference to his own project's "intellectual integrity" is that the Reporters'
work lacks that quality.
238 Id. at 1173.
239 Id. at 1173-75.
240 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 16, § 2 cmt. n:
n. Relationship of definitions of defect to traditional doctrinal categories. The
rules in this Section and in other provisions of Chapter 1 of this Restate-
ment define the bases of tort liability for harm caused by product defects
existing at time of sale or other distribution. The rules are stated function-
ally rather than in terms of traditional doctrinal categories. Claims based
on product defect at time of sale or other distribution must meet the requi-
sites set forth in Subsection (a), (b), or (c), or the other provisions in this
Chapter 1. As long as these requisites are met, doctrinal tort categories
such as negligence or strict liability may be utilized in bringing the claim.
Similarly, a product defect claim satisfying the requisites of Subsection
(a), (b), or (c) may be brought under the implied warranty of
merchantability provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
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The author's treatment of Alabama law on the subject of defec-
tive design reveals that he has confused doctrinal terminology with
underlying, functional substance. The author purports to refute what
he describes as the Reporters' claim that the general standard for de-
sign in that state is the traditional negligence standard.241 The author
points out that Alabama plaintiffs are required to prove only that the
design is unreasonably unsafe, not that the manufacturer was unrea-
sonable in designing it that way.2 42 However, assuming that the prod-
uct-related risks in most cases involving durable goods were known or
knowable at the time of sale (as they might not be, for example, in
cases involving toxic chemicals),243 to condemn a design for being un-
reasonably dangerous is inescapably to condemn the designer for hav-
ing been negligent. To insist otherwise would be akin to a professor
telling a law student that, while the brief the student wrote is awful,
the professor is not passing judgment on the student's skill in writing
it. Similarly, the author's insistence that strict liability is somehow be-
ing imposed if the court assesses the reasonableness of the design and
not the reasonableness of the designer's conduct is purest sophistry.
Indeed, the Alabama Supreme Court understands this even if the au-
thor does not.244
CONCLUSION: CONSENSUS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED
Myths do, indeed, die hard. But sooner or later they die. The
myth that the general standard for defective product design is unset-
fled and unclear has had a long life, but its time has come. Both nor-
241 Klemme, supra note 143, app. at 1177.
242 Id. (footnotes omitted):
[The Alabama decision relied on by the Reporters] does not, as claimed,
retain negligence or any other form of traditional fault as the only standard
for determining defective design. The court specifically held that the ordi-
nary consumers' expectations and contemplation tests of section 402A were
appropriate for determining whether the product was "defective" and "un-
reasonably dangerous." When those tests have been met, a defendant's
conduct constitutes "fault" or "negligence" as a matter of law. No other
proof of negligence or the like is required.
243 All of the reported decisions involving unknowable risks involve toxic chemicals.
See, e.g., Beshada v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (NJ. 1982) (involving asbes-
tos products).
244 See Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 140 (Ala. 1976) (emphasis
added):
By [purporting to apply strict liability for defective designs] we do not aban-
don the fault concept as has been done in somejurisdictions.... The manu-
facturer, or retailer, is held [strictly] liable because he has created an unreasonable
risk of harm.
.... The only real difference between strict tort liability and the tradi-
tional negligence theory in products liability cases is that those courts which
have adopted the rule of strict liability look to the dangerous characteristics
of the end product, rather than the methods or processes by which it was
produced.
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mative analysis of what courts should do and empirical analysis of what
they have done support this conclusion. By adopting risk-utility bal-
ancing with a reasonable alternative design requirement as the gen-
eral design standard, subject to the exceptions for demonstrably
defective and egregiously dangerous designs that this Article de-
scribes, the Restatement (Third) reflects the consensus view. The few
jurisdictions that remain in the minority on this issue may be expected
to join the majority, given time for reflection on what has transpired.
